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ABSTRACT 
One of the most controversial Supreme Court cases last year was 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.  In a sharply divided 5–4 
decision, the Court invalidated strict federal campaign finance laws and 
upheld the First Amendment right of corporations to spend unlimited sums 
of corporate money to support or oppose candidates in political elections.  
In response to the case, a grassroots popular movement called for an 
amendment to the Constitution establishing that money is not speech and 
that human beings, not corporations, are the only “persons” entitled to 
constitutional rights.  The movement ignited a national campaign to 
reverse the legal doctrine of corporate personhood, a doctrine that has 
allowed corporations for the last century to claim the same legal rights as 
natural persons.  By orchestrating a nationwide initiative to amend the 
Constitution, these grassroots groups hope to follow in the steps of other 
social justice movements, like the suffragists and the civil rights activists, 
that successfully organized to demand legal reform.  This Article analyzes 
this burgeoning popular movement and the challenges it faces.  The 
mobilization of these activist organizations raises important questions 
about the relevance of average citizens’ interpretations of constitutional 
meaning and the role of law in shaping beliefs.  This Article uses the 
doctrine of corporate personhood and the constitutional amendment 
campaign as points of departure for a broader analysis of the relationships 
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between social movements, constitutional legal reform, and the expressive 
function of the law.  The Article argues that, while the doctrine of 
constitutional corporate personhood may be indeterminate, it is not 
irrelevant.  In fact, it has a powerful expressive component that molds the 
way we treat corporations in modern society. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Controversial Supreme Court cases often draw national attention and 
serve as a rallying point for citizens to express their views on important 
political subjects.  One of the most controversial decisions in the Supreme 
Court’s last term was Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
1
  In 
a sharply divided 5–4 decision, the Court invalidated strict federal 
campaign finance laws and upheld the First Amendment right of 
corporations to spend unlimited sums of corporate money to support or 
oppose candidates in political election campaigns.  Finding that political 
speech is constitutionally protected whether it is uttered by an individual or 
by a corporation, the Court expressly overruled two of its prior First 
Amendment cases that had upheld prohibitions on corporate expenditures 
in political elections.
2
 
Described as the “most important decision of the term,”
3
 Citizens 
United drew widespread negative reaction and fierce criticism from across 
the country.  President Obama lamented, “This ruling strikes at our 
democracy itself. . . . I can’t think of anything more devastating to the 
public interest.”
4
  Quickly moving to introduce legislation to reverse the 
Supreme Court’s ruling, Senator Chris Dodd expressed “strong[] 
disagree[ment] with the Supreme Court’s conclusion that money is speech, 
and that corporations should be treated the same as individual Americans 
when it comes to protected, fundamental speech rights.”
5
  Other politicians 
followed suit, arguing that the holding opens the floodgates for streams of 
corporate money to pour into politics, drowning out the voices of average 
citizens.
6
  The Court was accused of partisanship and judicial activism,
7
 
 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 913 (holding that “[g]overnment may not suppress political speech on the 
basis of the speaker’s corporate identity” and expressly overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber 
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) and McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 
(2003)). 
 3. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Most Important Decision of the Term, TRIAL, May 2010, 
at 54; Michael Houston, Protecting Corporate and Labor Union Involvement in Elections, 
ORANGE CNTY. LAWYER, July 2010, at 10 (referring to Citizens United as “one of the most 
important campaign finance rulings in a century”). 
 4. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Turns Up Heat Over Ruling on Campaign Spending, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010, at A18. 
 5. Press Release, Senator Christopher S. Dodd, Sen. Dodd Introduces Constitutional 
Amendment to Reverse Supreme Court Campaign Finance Ruling (Feb. 25, 2010) (2010 
WLNR 3913103). 
 6. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator John Kerry, Kerry Blasts SCOTUS Campaign 
Finance Decision (Feb. 2, 2010) (2010 WLNR 2190036) (“[T]hanks to the Supreme Court, 
the system has now been tilted inexorably towards those who have the most money. . . . 
[T]his Supreme Court went out of its way to unleash the power of corporations in our 
politics.”).  The ruling also met with criticism from academics.  See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, 
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and polls showed that the vast majority of Americans opposed the ruling.
8
 
Although mainstream criticism of Citizens United has been widely 
publicized, a lesser known response to the case is a grassroots popular 
movement calling for an amendment to the United States Constitution 
establishing that money is not speech and that human beings, not 
corporations, are the only “persons” entitled to constitutional rights.  The 
movement, called “Move to Amend,” was launched immediately after 
Citizens United was announced and has ignited a campaign to strip 
corporations of all the constitutional rights they have obtained over the last 
century.
9
  The Supreme Court never explicitly stated in Citizens United that 
corporations are “persons” entitled to First Amendment rights; the Court 
chose instead to frame the issue in terms of whether the speech deserved 
protection, rather than the speaker.
10
  Critics argue, however, that the 
unstated premise of the case is that corporations are persons that enjoy the 
same free speech rights as human citizens.
11
  It is this notion that 
 
Commentary, Citizens United and the Threat to the Regulatory State, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16 (2010), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/piety.pdf 
(noting the potentially pernicious effect of the case on the commercial speech doctrine); 
Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech after Citizens 
United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365, 2369 (2010) (utilizing behavioral science to argue that 
Citizens United was wrongly decided); Lucian Bebchuk, Citizens United Impact: Corporate 
Political Speech is Bad for Shareholders, PROJECT SYNDICATE, (Feb. 23, 2010), 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bebchuk10 /English (stating that “the 
influence of corporations on politicians and political outcomes can be expected to weaken 
the rules that protect shareholders and ensure that companies are well-governed.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Tim Rutten, A Partisan Court Unmasked, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010, at 
A27 (arguing that Citizens United “demonstrates that this is a partisan court, willing to hand 
down sweeping decisions that ignore decades of jurisprudence based on five Republican 
votes”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Who Are the Judicial Activists Now?, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 22, 2010, at A29 (accusing the conservative justices of “using judicial review to 
advance the traditional conservative ideological agenda”); Editorial, A First Step in Control 
of Election $, BEMIDJI PIONEER, Apr. 30, 2010, 2010 WLNR 9007739 (quoting Senator Al 
Franken:  “Citizens United was an incredible act of judicial activism.  It turned back a 
century of federal law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 8. A Washington Post–ABC News poll indicated “relatively little difference of 
opinion on the issue among Democrats (85 percent opposed to the ruling), Republicans (76 
percent) and independents (81 percent).”  Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes 
Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign Financing, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html. 
 9. MOVE TO AMEND, http://www.movetoamend.org (last visited Sept. 24, 2011). 
 10. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“The Amendment is written in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers.  Its text offers 
no foothold for excluding any category of speaker . . . . We are therefore simply left with the 
question whether the speech at issue in this case is ‘speech’ covered by the First 
Amendment.”). 
 11. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 55 (noting that one of the “key premises” of 
Citizens United is that “corporations have the same free speech rights as citizens”); Nancy 
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corporations are persons that is so controversial.  The Move to Amend 
campaign seeks to reverse what it calls the “illegitimate legal doctrine of 
‘Corporate Personhood’” which has allowed corporations to claim to be 
persons under the law and therefore to claim the same legal rights as 
natural persons.
12
 
Move to Amend is an outgrowth of several activist organizations that 
have been in existence for some time and that have gained momentum in 
recent years.  Nationwide, well over a hundred grassroots community-
based civil rights and social justice groups have joined the Move to Amend 
coalition, including the National Lawyers Guild, the Alliance for 
Democracy, and the Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom.
13
  Many of these activist groups revile the dominance of 
corporate power in modern society.  They believe large corporations, with 
their vast concentrations of wealth and their enormous size, have amassed 
economic and political power comparable to government power.
14
  
Activists see multinational corporations as “governing institutions” that 
“largely decide what controversies get attention, how wealth is shared and 
distributed, what solutions are acceptable, who gets elected to public office 
and how the United States treats other nations.”
15
  They condemn the short-
 
Price & David E. Delk, Corporations Are Not People, THE ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, 
http://www.thealliancefordemocracy.org/brochure.pdf (arguing that a “crucial basis for this 
decision is that corporations, as ‘persons,’ enjoy free-speech rights”) (last visited Sept. 24, 
2011); see also Matthew Rothschild, Corporations Aren’t Persons, THE PROGRESSIVE (Apr. 
20, 2010), http://www.progressive.org/mrapril10.html  (criticizing the Court’s declaration 
that corporations cannot be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because 
they are not “natural persons”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12. Kaitlin Sopoci-Belknap, Citizens United v. FEC: Supreme Court Sides with Large 
Corporations, DEMOCRACY UNLIMITED OF HUMBOLDT CNTY. (Feb. 28, 2010, 4:30 PM), 
http://www.duhc.org/profiles/blogs/citizens-united-v-fec-supreme. 
 13. Organizations, MOVE TO AMEND, http://www.movetoamend.org/organizations (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2011).  Many of these organizations are themselves extensive coalitions of 
other progressive organizations, creating a nationwide network of activist groups that 
support an amendment to the Constitution to abolish corporate personhood.  Id. 
 14. Many scholars agree with this assessment of corporate power.  See, e.g., KENT 
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE 
POSSIBILITIES 4-5 (2006) (noting that corporations are among “the largest and most powerful 
institutions in the world,” wielding “the economic power of nations”); Michael Robertson, 
Property and Ideology, 8 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 275, 281 (1995) (arguing that corporate power 
is like governmental power and that it is misleading to view corporations as private property 
because of the great power they hold over natural people); Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to 
Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 179, 180 n.2 (2005) (“[T]he corporation’s economic, social, and cultural 
impact has become so pervasive in modern society so as to make corporate power, in effect, 
comparable to the coercive power of the state.”). 
 15. Mission, DEMOCRACY UNLIMITED OF HUMBOLDT CNTY.,  
http://www.duhc.org/page/mission-1; About the Alliance for Democracy, THE ALLIANCE FOR 
DEMOCRACY, http://www.thealliancefordemocracy.org/about.html (“Major corporations 
dominate our lives, our government, our work, our health care and our food supply.”) 
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term profit-maximizing dynamic of the corporation, and they view the 
relentless pursuit of corporate profit as the greatest cause of political, 
economic, and ecological injury around the world.  The corporate failings 
that have played a role in the recent financial crisis confirm the dominant 
nature of large corporations in our lives and our deep dependence on them 
for our financial welfare. 
The grassroots organizations behind the Move to Amend project trace 
the roots of this corporate power to the legal doctrine of corporate 
personhood.
16
  Under the law, a corporation is an artificial person; its 
personhood status is a legal fiction we employ as a convenience to facilitate 
commerce.
17
  By calling the corporation a person, the law grants it the 
capacity for legal relations of all kinds.  The corporation has standing to 
enter into contracts, to hold property, to sue and be sued, and ultimately to 
carry on business in the corporate name.
18
  This legal step does not seem 
particularly problematic.  Activists warn, however, that it leads us down a 
 
(emphasis omitted); see also LEE DRUTMAN & CHARLIE CRAY, THE PEOPLE’S BUSINESS: 
CONTROLLING CORPORATIONS AND RESTORING DEMOCRACY 1–7 (2004) (describing the 
dominance of corporate power and the fundamental threat it poses to the well-being of our 
society). 
 16. While the legal doctrine of corporate personhood has profoundly impacted the way 
we view corporations, it is by no means the sole lens through which the corporate person 
can be analyzed.  I have described elsewhere the complex nature of the personhood of 
corporations and the value of evaluating corporate personhood from multiple disciplines.  
Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-dimensional Approach to the 
Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97 (2009) (analyzing the 
multi-faceted nature of corporate personhood and proposing a flexible, multi-dimensional 
model of the corporation). 
 17. See Jeffrey Nesteruk, Persons, Property, and the Corporation: A Proposal for a 
New Paradigm, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 543, 564 n.133 (1990) (“A corporation is artificial in 
that it is a human creation subject to human choices.”); James V. Schall, The Corporation: 
What Is It?, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 105, 118 (2006) (describing the corporation as primarily 
a human invention created for man’s use).  Legal personhood can be given to just about any 
object if it is deemed to serve the ends of justice.  See, e.g., Richard Tur, The “Person” in 
Law, in PERSONS AND PERSONALITY: A CONTEMPORARY INQUIRY 116, 121 (Arthur Peacocke 
& Grant Gillett eds., 1987) (referring to a case where an Indian idol was given a legal 
personality); see also Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 347, 
350 (1911) (noting that purely inanimate objects may be personified, e.g., the estate of a 
deceased person, a jury, or a community).  The term “natural person” typically refers to 
human beings.  See Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for 
Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 373 (2007) (“‘Natural person’ is the term used to 
refer to human beings’ legal status.”). 
 18. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2005) stating: 
[E]very corporation has perpetual duration and succession in its corporate name 
and has the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or 
convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including without limitation 
power:  (1) to sue and be sued, . . . (4) to . . . own, hold, improve, use, and 
otherwise deal with, real or personal property, . . . (7) to make contracts and 
guarantees . . . . 
RIPKEN_FINALIZED_FOUR (DO NOT DELETE)   
2011] CORPORATE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 215 
 
slippery slope.  Once the law recognizes the corporation as a person, it does 
not take much to decide corporations then have legal standing as persons to 
claim all manner of basic rights, including constitutional rights originally 
intended for individuals.  Indeed, in a series of cases over the last century, 
the Supreme Court has held corporations are persons entitled to numerous 
constitutional protections, and the Court has consequently invalidated laws 
infringing on those corporate rights.
19
  Activists argue that with the shield 
of constitutional corporate personhood, corporations are able to resist the 
enforcement of laws, such as environmental and criminal laws, that 
regulate corporate operations and protect human beings from coercive 
corporate harm.  They fear the corporate creation has now become more 
powerful than its human creators.  The only way to remedy this problem is 
to take personhood away from corporations and restore power to “We the 
People” through a constitutional amendment. 
The overriding mission of these activist groups is to overthrow 
“corporate rule” in our society.
20
  I call them Corporate Abolitionists 
because they see their work as similar to that of the early abolitionists who 
demanded an end to slavery.  One of their widely used slogans resonates 
with this theme:  “Slavery is the legal fiction that a person is property.  
Corporate personhood is the legal fiction that property is a person.”
21
  The 
Corporate Abolitionists do not argue that large corporations must be more 
socially responsible or that we should adopt stricter laws to regulate 
corporate behavior and reign in corporate power.  Instead, the Corporate 
Abolitionists believe the abolition of corporate personhood is an issue of 
human rights, like the abolition of slavery.  The whole institution is 
fundamentally wrong and must be eradicated if we are to have true 
democracy.  In mobilizing the grassroots Move to Amend campaign, 
Corporate Abolitionists feel now is the time for a popular uprising to end 
the dominance of corporations in our country.  In essence, their movement 
calls for the complete revocation of corporate legal personhood and the 
unraveling of 125 years of constitutional jurisprudence.  By orchestrating a 
nationwide initiative to add a twenty-eighth amendment to the Constitution, 
the Corporate Abolitionists hope to follow in the model of other social 
 
 19. The Supreme Court first stated that corporations were persons for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).  See 
discussion of Santa Clara and the Supreme Court’s subsequent expansion of corporate 
constitutional rights infra notes 41–55 and accompanying text. 
 20. Barbara Clancy, National Meeting Builds Move to Amend Coalition, MOVE TO 
AMEND (May 20, 2010), http://www.movetoamend.org/news/national-meeting-builds-
move-amend-coalition; Jan Edwards & Molly Morgan, Abolish Corporate Personhood, 
RECLAIM DEMOCRACY (May 20, 2004), http://www.reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood/ 
edwards_morgan_corporate.html. 
 21. Molly Morgan & Jan Edwards, Abolish Corporate Personhood, 59 GUILD PRAC. 
209, 214 (2002). 
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justice movements, like the suffragists and the civil rights activists, that 
successfully organized to demand legal reform.
22
 
The arguments of the Corporate Abolitionists are intriguing.  On the 
one hand, critics might dismiss these anti-corporate activists as utopians, 
radicals, or fringe segments of society that condemn large corporations and 
oppose modern capitalism.  Their protests, marches, and rallies are nothing 
to take too seriously because their goals are extreme and there is little 
likelihood they will achieve their ultimate objective.  On the other hand, the 
voice of the Corporate Abolitionists is getting louder, and they are gaining 
more converts to their cause.
23
  They have begun to capitalize on the 
growing anger and frustration that average citizens feel over the prolonged 
economic recession, the loss of jobs, excessive executive compensation, 
and the faltering financial markets.  The arguments of the Corporate 
Abolitionists strike a chord with many Americans whose resentment 
toward large corporations and Wall Street has only been heightened by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United. 
The academic literature to this point has not focused significantly on 
the modern Corporate Abolitionist movement.  This Article seeks to bring 
attention to this burgeoning popular movement and the challenges that it 
faces.  Controversial Supreme Court decisions like the recent Citizens 
United case can ignite strong public opposition, but it is uncertain whether 
they can galvanize sufficiently strong social movements to mandate 
constitutional change.  The mobilization of the Corporate Abolitionists in 
response to Citizens United raises important questions about the relevance 
of citizens’ interpretations of constitutional meaning and the role of the law 
in shaping beliefs.  This Article uses the doctrine of corporate personhood 
and the Corporate Abolitionists’ Move to Amend campaign as points of 
departure for a much broader analysis of the relationships between social 
movements, constitutional legal reform, and the expressive function of the 
law. 
Part II of the Article begins with an overview of how corporations 
came to be called persons under the law.  Although the word “corporation” 
does not appear anywhere in the Constitution, early corporate personhood 
theories provided a basis for the Supreme Court to declare that corporations 
are persons for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and 
equal protection clauses.  The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to 
protect the rights of newly freed slaves, but the formative years of 
constitutional interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment were marked by 
significant expansions of corporate constitutional rights, rather than the 
 
 22. Defend Democracy: Join with Us to Abolish Corporate Personhood, WOMEN’S 
INT’L LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, http://www.wilpf.org/SupremeCtCitizen 
UnitedDecision (last visited Sept. 24, 2011). 
 23. See discussion of growing Corporate Abolitionist movement infra Part III. 
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rights of African-American individuals.  The Supreme Court thereafter 
interpreted the Constitution to extend rights to corporations in several other 
contexts, including the First Amendment.  Part II describes the 
development of these corporate constitutional rights and the road leading to 
the Supreme Court’s latest confirmation of corporate free speech rights in 
Citizens United. 
It is this expansion of corporate constitutional rights that makes 
Corporate Abolitionists so angry.  Part III will highlight the Corporate 
Abolitionists’ movement, who they are, how they have framed their 
arguments, what their work has accomplished, and where they hope their 
efforts will lead them.  How widespread is their message?  Can they 
effectively mobilize the public to support an amendment to the 
Constitution?  In scrutinizing their repertoire of protest, Part III will show 
that the activities of the Corporate Abolitionists have grown increasingly 
more visible and their voices are finding audiences prone to listen.  The 
phrase “corporate personhood” is popping into popular culture,
24
 and the 
Corporate Abolitionists seek to make it a rallying cry. 
Part of the problem with the Corporate Abolitionists’ strategy, 
however, is that they place so much weight on that corporate personhood 
designation.  The assumption underlying their Move to Amend campaign is 
that a constitutional amendment revoking the personhood of corporations 
will effectively diminish the power of corporations and dramatically 
transform society.  But Part IV suggests that the personhood concept is 
largely indeterminate and sometimes irrelevant.  Legal history reveals that 
the personhood label has been arbitrarily applied in constitutional law 
cases, suggesting that the label itself does not dictate necessary outcomes.  
We could just as easily refer to “the corporation as a right and duty bearing 
unit,”
25
 rather than a person, and the corporation would still have all the 
same rights it has now.  In this sense, the personhood designation may not 
be as weighty a concept as the Corporate Abolitionists think it is. 
Nonetheless, the Corporate Abolitionists may be on to something with 
their focus on personhood.  While they may not characterize their argument 
in these terms, their call to abandon the legal personhood of corporations 
reflects recognition of the symbolic and expressive function of the law.  
The Corporate Abolitionists’ views are rooted in a legitimate concern about 
the power of legal labeling to create realities and shape beliefs.  Law plays 
 
 24. For example, Philosophy Talk, a popular radio show that is broadcast along the 
West Coast and hosted by two Stanford philosophy professors, recently aired a show on the 
personhood of corporations on June 20, 2010.  The title of the show was “The Corporation 
as a Person,” featuring Robert A. G. Monks, shareholder activist and author of CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2008).  The Corporation as a Person, PHILOSOPHY TALK (June 20, 2010), 
http://www.philosophytalk.org/shows/corporation-person. 
 25. George F. Deiser, The Juristic Person, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 300, 313 (1909). 
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a role in forming prevailing values and understandings.  Calling a 
corporation a person makes it so in our minds.  Legal language does not 
merely describe a state of affairs, but helps to bring that state of affairs into 
existence.
26
  This linguistic function of law ties into broader questions 
about the importance of legal labeling in altering our belief system.  If the 
law does more than declare winners and losers, if it changes the way we 
perceive our world and the worth we place on those who succeed in 
constitutional litigation, then perhaps it is imperative that we pay close 
attention to the unspoken signals law sends about social values.  As Part V 
explains, the differing views of the Corporate Abolitionists and their critics 
reflect differing views of the symbolic nature of law itself.  Corporate 
Abolitionists see the law as a much more comprehensive tool for 
constructing cognitive categories and creating truth, and in this regard, their 
emphasis on the personhood designation is not necessarily misplaced. 
Part VI concludes that the Corporate Abolitionist movement serves a 
limited but relevant function in our system of constitutional change.  Social 
movements mold an environment for people to discuss the important 
constitutional issues of the day.
27
  They give citizens “an opportunity to talk 
back to institutions of power and to have a voice in the development of 
constitutional norms.”
28
  The Corporate Abolitionists’ mobilization in 
response to the Citizens United case reflects collective participation in 
constitutional interpretation.  From the perspective of popular 
constitutionalism, the legal system needs such participation even if the 
social movement does not succeed in its ultimate objective. 
II.   CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CORPORATIONS 
A.  Early Corporate Personhood Theories 
The artificial person theory of the corporation dominated American 
thinking about corporate personhood in the first half of the nineteenth 
century.
29
  This theory is also referred to as the concession theory.  It stated 
that corporations are legally formed when the state approves their charters, 
and therefore, the personhood of corporations is merely a government 
concession.
30
  The classic statement of the theory is found in Chief Justice 
 
 26. See infra notes 192–200 and accompanying text. 
 27. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 927, 948 (2006). 
 28. Id. at 946. 
 29. William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical 
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 434 (1989); Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real 
Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1065 (1994). 
 30. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational 
Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 292–93 (1990) (discussing the history of the 
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Marshall’s description of the corporation in Trustees of Dartmouth College 
v. Woodward:  “A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, 
and existing only in contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, 
it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers 
upon it . . . .”
31
  The corporation is artificial, fictional, and conditional 
because it cannot come into being unless and until the law sanctions it. 
Corporations during that period required a special act of the state 
legislature to approve their charters on a case-by-case basis.
32
  States 
typically granted corporate charters for enterprises that served a public 
function and met specific social needs, e.g., public utilities, banks, insurers, 
transportation services, and water works.
33
  “[T]he corporate privilege was 
granted sparingly; and only when the grant seemed necessary in order to 
procure for the community some specific benefit otherwise unattainable.”
34
  
Thus, legislative approvals of charters were seen as special grants or 
privileges by the sovereign, underscoring the view of corporations as 
concessions of the government.  The state played a decisive role in creating 
corporations and circumscribing their actions within limited spheres of 
activity.  Early charters often contained specific provisions maintaining 
some measure of control over corporations to protect the public from 
 
concession theory and describing its essential characteristics).  The theory has been called 
several different names, including the state grant theory, the fictitious personality theory, the 
artificial personality theory, and the concession theory.  Ron Harris, The Transplantation of 
the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From German Codification to 
British Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1424 
(2006). 
 31. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodword, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). 
 32. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 188–201 (2d ed. 
1985) (discussing the evolution of the state legislature’s role in granting corporate charters 
during the nineteenth century). 
 33. See JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1780–1970 17 (1970) (“From the 1780’s well into mid-nineteenth 
century the most frequent and conspicuous use of the business corporation . . . was for one 
particular type of enterprise, that which we later called public utility and put under particular 
regulation because of its special impact in the community.”); William W. Bratton, Jr., The 
New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1484 (1989) (“The American states tended to confer charters on businesses that 
received state franchises . . . and thus were perceived to require regulation outside of the 
market system.”); see also Martha T. McCluskey, The Substantive Politics of Formal 
Corporate Power, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1453, 1475 (2006) (noting that the legal power to 
confer corporate charters was held by the legislature and exercised to confer “special 
privileges for limited periods and for limited public purposes”).  Because corporations were 
considered bodies created by law for the purpose of attaining some public end, they were 
therefore “arms of the state.”  Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller, Introduction: 
Corporate America, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (Warren 
J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987) [hereinafter CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY]. 
 34. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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abusive corporate practices.
35
 
By the mid-nineteenth century, special chartering gave way to general 
incorporation statutes.  Special incorporations for businesses were regarded 
as the corrupt result of legislative bribery, political favoritism, and 
monopolistic practices.
36
  In response to public dissatisfaction, states 
adopted general incorporation statutes allowing businesses to incorporate 
freely without special grants from the legislature.
37
  The act of 
incorporation with the state thus became merely a formality of filing and 
played little role in the personhood of corporations.  The idea that 
corporations existed only because of the concession of the state held far 
less force and was replaced with the belief that the corporation actually 
owed its existence to the individuals who formed the corporation to 
conduct their business.  As a result, the artificial person theory of the 
corporation diminished in relevance over time. 
An alternative view of the corporate person arose during the last half 
of the nineteenth century.  The aggregate theory emphasized that the 
corporation could not be formed without the action and agreement of 
human beings.  In fact, no corporate acts would ever occur without the 
 
 35. For example, states often strictly regulated banking activity through limited powers 
granted in bank charters and through strict construction of those charters by the courts.  
Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1444 (1987).  See also McCluskey, supra note 33, at 1478 (“Some 
legislatures structured corporations to ensure equal voting power for smaller investors; to 
require favorable treatment of the poor; or to ensure that investors and managers retained 
private individual responsibility for corporate debts and liabilities.”).  At times, states even 
regulated the prices that corporations could charge and the rate of return that investors could 
earn.  Id. at 1476.  Courts also tended to support broad state powers over corporations.  See, 
e.g., Leep v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 25 S.W. 75, 81 (Ark. 1894) (holding 
that even though legislatures lacked power to dictate how natural persons paid their 
employees, legislatures had the power to do so with corporate employers). 
 36. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate 
Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985) (discussing the movement away from a 
concession theory of the corporation and towards free incorporation laws “that would break 
the connection between the act of incorporation and political favoritism”); Mark, supra note 
35, at 1453–54 (discussing the corruption and political favoritism associated with the special 
privileges of incorporation); see also CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE 
SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 20 (1975) (noting that the special charter 
procedure became increasingly unpopular because of its association with monopoly favors 
and legislative corruption). 
 37. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 512 (“It was cheap and easy to incorporate under 
general laws—a few papers filed, a few forms and signatures; the privilege of incorporation 
lay open to whoever wanted it.”); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of 
the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 767, 792 (2005) (discussing the elimination of corrupt special chartering and the 
subsequent enactment of general incorporation laws “permitting anyone to form a 
corporation on payment of a fee, without permission by the state legislature”); see also 
STONE, supra note 36 (noting that by the end of the nineteenth century, general 
incorporation statutes had displaced special charters entirely). 
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human persons who made up the corporate entity.  Therefore, the 
corporation was seen more as a collection, or aggregate, of individuals who 
agreed to utilize the corporation for their mutual benefit.  The aggregate 
theory maintained that the corporate person has no existence or identity that 
is separate and apart from the natural persons in the corporation.
38
  The 
entity is “owned, managed, and administered by people, [and] its so called 
actions are but manifestations of actions by real persons.”
39
  It makes no 
sense to see the corporation literally as a distinct person. 
Under this view of the corporate person, “the rights and duties of an 
incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties of the persons 
who compose it, and not of an imaginary being.”
40
  The United States 
Supreme Court implicitly relied on this view in Santa Clara v. Southern 
Pacific Railroad Co. when it declared that a corporation is a person for 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, its property cannot be 
taxed differently from the property of individuals.
41
  The underlying 
reasoning was that the corporation’s property was really just the property of 
the individual shareholders who owned the corporation, and therefore 
should be protected in the same manner.
42
  “To deprive the corporation of 
its property . . . is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of their property . . . . 
[T]he courts will look through the ideal entity and name of the corporation 
to the persons who compose it, and protect them . . . .”
43
  The interesting 
thing about the Santa Clara case is that, although it was about taxes, its 
defining feature was what it casually said about corporate constitutional 
 
 38. 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 1–2 (2d 
ed. 1886) (stating that it is “self-evident that a corporation is not in reality a person or a 
thing distinct from its constituent parts.  The word ‘corporation’ is but a collective name for 
the corporators or members who compose [it].”); PATRICIA H. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, 
AND CORPORATIONS 51 (1985) (“Corporations have no reality over and above their 
constituents, because they are created by and function only because of them.”). 
 39. Donald R. Cressey, The Poverty of Theory in Corporate Crime Research, in 1 
ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 31, 36 (William S. Laufer & Freda Adler eds., 
1989). 
 40. 1 MORAWETZ, supra note 38, at 3. 
 41. Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
 42. Morton Horwitz explained that the Court’s decision relied on the aggregate theory 
arguments of John Pomeroy, counsel for the railroad company, and Justice Field in his 
circuit court opinion in the companion case, San Mateo v. So. Pac. R.R. Co. (The Railroad 
Tax Cases), 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).  Horwitz, supra note 36, at 177–78.  Justice Field 
wrote:  “It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision intended for the 
protection of every person against partial and discriminating legislation by the states, should 
cease to exert such protection the moment the person becomes a member of a corporation.”  
San Mateo, 13 F. at 744. 
 43. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 747–48, appeal dismissed as moot sub nom.  San 
Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885); see also Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 
F. 385, 404–05 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883), aff’d, 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (explaining how corporations 
are groups of associated people that are entitled to the same constitutional protections as 
individual persons). 
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rights.  As the next section explains, Santa Clara is regarded as the 
launching point for the development of corporate personhood status under 
the Constitution. 
B.   Development of Corporate Constitutional Personhood 
When the Constitution refers to persons, it does not speak of 
corporations, but human beings, or natural persons.  Large corporations are 
“something that could not have been even remotely in the minds of the men 
who drafted the Constitution.”
44
  In 1886, however, the Supreme Court 
announced in Santa Clara that a corporation—in that case, a large railroad 
company—was a person for purposes of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
45
  This conclusion was made without explanation 
or analysis.  In fact, the announcement does not appear in the text of the 
opinion at all.  Rather, in the introductory portion of the case, the 
Reporter’s Note states that prior to oral argument the Chief Justice declared 
from the bench: 
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question 
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these 
corporations.  We are all of opinion that it does.
46
 
This brief and conclusory statement has been widely criticized for 
lacking logic, history, and reason to support it.
47
  The text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not include corporations, and there was nothing in the 
legislative history of the Amendment to indicate corporations were 
intended to be beneficiaries of its protections.  Instead, it was well known 
that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to provide procedural 
 
 44. CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY, supra note 33, at 6. 
 45. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., John J. Flynn, The Jurisprudence of Corporate Personhood: The Misuse 
of a Legal Concept, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY, supra note 33, at 131, 133, 136 
(arguing that the Court utilized a specious method for recognizing corporate personhood in 
Santa Clara); Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have Employed Bogus 
Jurisprudence to Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 552–59 (2010) (arguing that Santa Clara cannot be interpreted as 
giving corporations rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).  Some Supreme Court justices 
have since challenged Santa Clara’s statement that corporations are constitutional persons.  
See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 579–80 (1949) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (“‘Persons’ in the first sentence plainly include only human beings, for 
corporations are not ‘born or naturalized.’ . . . I can only conclude that the Santa Clara case 
was wrong and should be overruled.”); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 
(1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Neither the history nor the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment justifies the belief that corporations are included within its protection.”). 
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and substantive rights for newly freed slaves.
48
  Nonetheless, the Santa 
Clara pronouncement became the foundation of the corporate personhood 
doctrine for purposes of constitutional analysis.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment was thereafter interpreted to protect the rights of corporations 
far more often than it was held to protect black citizens.  For the first fifty 
years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, more than fifty 
percent of the Supreme Court cases applying the Fourteenth Amendment 
involved corporations, and less than one half of one percent involved race 
discrimination claims.
49
  The Supreme Court repeatedly confirmed 
corporations were persons within the meaning of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus paved the way for 
corporations to gain additional constitutional rights.
50
 
From that point on, the Supreme Court gradually extended rights to 
corporate persons under several provisions of the Constitution.  For 
example, the Court has held corporations are entitled to Fourth Amendment 
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures,
51
 Fifth Amendment 
protection against double jeopardy,
52
 the Seventh Amendment right to a 
trial by jury,
53
 and importantly for purposes of this Article, First 
 
 48. EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863–1869 93–
120 (1990); see also Howard J. Graham, Our “Declaratory” Fourteenth Amendment, 7 
STAN. L. REV. 3, 5 (1954) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment synthesized concepts that 
had “spearheaded the organized antislavery movement’s constitutional attack on slavery and 
racial discrimination”). 
 49. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 303 U.S. at 90 (noting the Court’s vastly disproportionate 
usage of the Fourteenth Amendment in the first fifty years since its adoption).  Many 
scholars decry this result.  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or 
Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
27, 53 (2005) (noting “there is something deeply distressing about the fact that an 
amendment designed to protect the rights of black citizens was soon interpreted to given 
[sic] them virtually no protection whatsoever and instead gave constitutional protection to 
corporations”). 
 50. See, e.g., Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897) (“It 
is well settled that corporations are persons within the provisions of the [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment of the [C]onstitution of the United States.”); Covington & Lexington Tpk. 
Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896) (“It is now settled that corporations are 
persons, within the meaning of the constitutional provisions forbidding the deprivation of 
property without due process of law, as well as a denial of the equal protection of the 
laws.”). 
 51. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 
476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986) (observing that a corporation has a reasonable, legitimate, and 
objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered buildings for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment). 
 52. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 572 (1977).  
However, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has been denied to 
corporations on the grounds that it is a purely personal right applying only to natural 
persons.  United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944). 
 53. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970). 
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Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of the press.
54
  Expanding 
“these [constitutional] rights has legitimized corporations as constitutional 
actors and placed them on a level with humans in terms of Bill of Rights 
safeguards.”
55
 
The corporation’s First Amendment right to speak has arguably been 
the most controversial, and the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Citizens 
United has revived the debate over whether corporations should be 
considered persons for constitutional purposes.  The following discussion 
provides a closer look at the Citizens United case and discusses the impact 
it has had since its release. 
C.   Corporate Free Speech Rights and Citizens United 
The Supreme Court affirmed and extended the First Amendment 
speech rights of corporations in Citizens United.
56
  The case dealt with 
federal campaign finance laws and the ability of corporations to spend 
money in support of or in opposition to political candidates.
57
 
Citizens United was a nonprofit corporation that released a film 
entitled, Hillary: The Movie, during Hillary Clinton’s candidacy for the 
Democratic presidential nomination in 2008.  The movie was “a feature-
length negative advertisement that urge[d] viewers to vote against [Hillary] 
Clinton for President.”
58
  The corporation wanted to increase the movie’s 
public distribution by making it available through video-on-demand in the 
days leading up to the primary election, but feared it would violate the 
federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”).
59
  The BCRA 
prohibits corporations from using general treasury funds to make 
independent expenditures for “electioneering communication[s],” which 
are defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that refers 
to a political candidate for federal office and is made within thirty days of a 
primary election.
60
  The initial question presented to the Court was whether 
the BCRA provision applied to the video-on-demand movie.  After oral 
 
 54. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (noting that the 
inherent worth of speech does not depend on the identity of its source, whether corporation 
or individual); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 251 (1936) (recognizing the 
fundamental nature of First Amendment rights). 
 55. Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 
41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 650–51 (1990). 
 56. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 57. The Supreme Court has previously held that expenditures of money are a form of 
political speech, and therefore, restrictions on the ability of a person or group to spend 
money on political communications during campaigns are constitutionally impermissible.  
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976). 
 58. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 890. 
 59. Id. at 888. 
 60. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(b)(2), 434(f)(3)(A) (2005). 
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argument, however, the Court asked the parties for new briefing to address 
the much broader question of whether this statute limiting corporations’ 
independent spending in federal elections should be declared 
unconstitutional. 
By a narrow majority, the Court held in a 5–4 decision that the 
BCRA’s ban on corporate campaign expenditures violated the 
corporation’s right to free speech and must be invalidated.  The Court 
reaffirmed that the First Amendment extends to corporations engaging in 
political speech.  According to the Court, “political speech does not lose 
First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a corporation.’”
61
  
A corporation, just like an individual, can contribute to the marketplace of 
ideas by expressing opinions and spending money to support or oppose 
political candidates.  The Court rejected the idea that political speech of 
corporations should be treated differently under the First Amendment 
simply because corporations are not “natural persons.”
62
  Instead, the First 
Amendment protects all political speech and does not allow restrictions 
based on a speaker’s corporate identity.  “Political speech is ‘indispensable 
to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the 
speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual.’”
63
  To support 
its conclusion, the Court expressly overruled two of its previous First 
Amendment cases that had upheld campaign finance laws restricting 
corporate expenditures, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
64
 and 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.
65
 
In Austin, the Supreme Court sustained a Michigan law banning 
corporate independent expenditures that supported or opposed candidates 
for state office.  The Michigan Chamber of Commerce sought to use 
general treasury funds to run a newspaper ad supporting a political 
candidate.  The Austin court explained that the structure of corporations 
facilitates the amassing of immense wealth in corporate treasuries, and that 
these large aggregations of funds can have distorting effects in the political 
marketplace when they are deployed to influence elections.
66
  The Austin 
Court therefore held that “the State ha[d] articulated a sufficiently 
compelling rationale to support its restriction on independent expenditures 
by corporations,” and the Court sustained the speech prohibition.
67
  
Subsequently in McConnell, the Court relied on the anti-distortion interest 
 
 61. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 904 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777). 
 64. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 65. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 66. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
 67. Id. 
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articulated in Austin to uphold the same federal campaign finance law at 
issue in Citizens United, i.e., the BCRA provision restricting corporate 
independent expenditures.
68
 
The majority opinion in Citizens United rejected the anti-distortion 
rationale recognized in Austin and McConnell.  The majority felt it was 
improper to focus on the economic wealth of corporate speakers and the 
potential unfair advantage that wealth might afford to corporations in the 
political marketplace.  “The First Amendment’s protections do not depend 
on the speaker’s ‘financial ability to engage in public discussion.’”
69
  The 
Court reasoned that because the First Amendment prohibits the suppression 
of political speech based on the speaker’s identity, it necessarily also 
forbids limitations on political speech based on a speaker’s wealth.
70
  Thus, 
the Citizens United Court overruled both Austin and McConnell in striking 
down the BCRA’s ban on corporate independent expenditures, thereby 
solidifying the First Amendment free speech rights of corporations. 
Interestingly, the Court never focused on the issue of corporate 
personhood anywhere in its opinion.  The Court never stated that because 
corporations are persons, they must be treated just like individuals for 
purposes of the First Amendment.  Instead, the Court framed the issue in 
terms of whether the speech is the type of speech the First Amendment 
protects, not whether the speaker is the type of person who can claim First 
Amendment rights.
71
  Because the political speech here is covered by the 
First Amendment, it does not matter that it is uttered by a corporation 
rather than a human being. 
In his partial dissent, Justice Stevens faults the majority for failing to 
address the nature of the speaker.  He points out that it is constitutionally 
permissible to regulate speech based on the speaker’s identity in many 
other contexts, e.g., the speech rights of students, prisoners, military 
personnel, and government employees.
72
  The dissent distinguishes between 
 
 68. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205. 
 69. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904. 
 70. Id. at 905.  In addition to rejecting the anti-distortion rationale, the Court also 
rejected the argument that corporate political speech can be banned to prevent corruption, or 
the appearance of corruption, of political officials.  The Court concluded that independent 
corporate expenditures do not lead to, or even create the appearance of, corruption.  Id. at 
908–11. 
 71. See id. at 929 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Amendment is written in terms of 
‘speech,’ not speakers.  Its text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker . . . 
. We are therefore simply left with the question whether the speech at issue in this case is 
‘speech’ covered by the First Amendment.”).  This distinction between speech and the 
speaker draws on the Court’s reasoning in First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
783–85 (1978). 
 72. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 945 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  For a discussion of the limited free speech rights of students and prisoners, see 
generally Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 WASH. L. REV. 71 
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corporations and human beings, and argues that corporations must be seen 
for what they really are:  “[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, 
no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.  Corporations help structure and 
facilitate the activities of human beings . . . and their ‘personhood’ [is] . . . a 
useful legal fiction.  But they are not themselves members of ‘We the 
People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.”
73
  
When the Framers drafted the First Amendment, it was the free speech of 
individual Americans they had in mind, not the unlimited expenditures of 
giant corporations.
74
  Corporations with their vast wealth and economic 
power have the ability to overpower non-corporate voices and gain special 
advantages from politicians they support.  The dissent characterizes the 
majority’s opinion as “a rejection of the common sense of the American 
people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from 
undermining self-government . . . and who have fought against the 
distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering . . . .”
75
 
Many people agree with the dissent.  Polls showed that well over two 
thirds of the American public oppose the Citizens United ruling.
76
  
President Obama called the case “a major victory for big oil, Wall Street 
banks . . . and the other powerful interests that marshal their power every 
day in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.”
77
  He 
denounced the decision as a “ruling [that] strikes at our democracy itself.”
78
  
Some federal lawmakers reacted quickly to attempt to undo the Court’s 
holding.  The day Citizens United was decided, legislation was proposed in 
 
(2010). 
 73. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 74. Id. at 950.  The dissent cites historical evidence of the suspicion with which 
corporations were viewed in the founding era and argues that the Framers assumed 
corporations could be comprehensively regulated for the public welfare.  Id. at 948–52. 
 75. Id. at 979.  Criticizing the majority’s rejection of the anti-corruption rationale for 
campaign finance restrictions, the dissent maintains that the enormous power of 
corporations in federal elections gives rise to the threat of both actual corruption and the 
public perception of corruption.  Id. at 961–68. 
 76. A Washington Post–ABC News poll indicated that “among Democrats (85 percent 
opposed . . . the ruling), Republicans (76 percent) and independents (81 percent).”  Eggen, 
supra note 8. 
 77. Robert Barnes & Dan Eggen, Court Rejects Corporate Political Spending Limits, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1.  President Obama called the ruling “a green light to a 
new stampede of special interest money” and vowed to work with congressional leaders to 
“develop a forceful response.”  Id. 
 78. Stolberg, supra note 4, at A18.  In his State of the Union address, with members of 
the Supreme Court present, President Obama attacked the decision, saying the case “will 
open the floodgates for special interests . . . to spend without limit in our elections.”  Robert 
Barnes, Alito Dissents on Obama Critique of Court Decision, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2010, at 
A6; see also Adam Liptak, A Rare Rebuke, In Front of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, 
at A12 (noting the unusually public nature of President Obama’s criticism of the Supreme 
Court’s decision). 
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Congress to prohibit corporations from using operating funds for ads in 
connection with any federal election campaign.
79
  A few weeks later, 
Congresswoman Donna Edwards introduced a constitutional amendment to 
allow Congress and the states to regulate the expenditure of funds by 
corporations for political speech.
80
 
State and local leaders who opposed the Citizens United result also 
responded in the weeks after the decision was announced.  For example, 
several members of the Alaska state legislature introduced bills to clarify 
that corporations are not persons for purposes of campaign contributions in 
public office elections.
81
  The mayor and city council of Berkeley, 
California, adopted a resolution calling for amending the California 
Constitution to declare that corporations are not entitled to the rights of 
persons, that the expenditure of corporate money is not constitutionally 
protected speech, and to request that other jurisdictions take a similar 
stand.
82
  Local public rallies were organized by democracy groups around 
the nation to protest the Citizens United decision.  In a “March to Overrule 
the Court” at the Wisconsin State Capitol, hundreds of people gathered to 
express their outrage over the decision.
83
  Rally organizers declared, “The 
Supreme Court didn’t give [corporations] a voice, it gave them a 
megaphone . . . What this court did in this case was make [corporations] a 
master race.  They amplified their voice.  And supercharged their power.”
84
 
Corporate Abolitionists had been watching the Citizens United case 
closely.  When the decision was announced, they quickly mobilized to form 
the Move to Amend project.  Their goal is to orchestrate a grassroots 
initiative to convene a national constitutional convention that would adopt 
 
 79. H.R.J. Res. 68, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 80. H.R.J. Res. 74, 111th Cong. (2010); see also Press Release, Congresswoman Donna 
F. Edwards, Rep. Edwards, Judiciary Committee Chairman Conyers Introduce 
Constitutional Amendment to Fix Flawed Supreme Court Ruling on Campaign Finance 
(Feb. 3, 2010) (2010 WLNR 2203599). 
 81. H.R. 358-59, 26th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2010), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/ 
26/Bills/HB0358A.pdf, http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/26/Bills/HB0359A.pdf; see also 
Press Release, Alaska State Legislature House of Representatives, House Democratic 
Caucus, Democratic Legislators Seek to Limit Corporate Influence on Elections (Feb. 19, 
2010), http://www.akdemocrats.org/gara/022410_note_from_gara.htm (explaining the 
motivation behind the proposal of the two bills). 
 82. Berkeley City Council Res. No. 64,859-N.S., Apr. 27, 2010 (on file with author); 
Alliance for Democracy, Berkeley Says No “Free Speech” for Corporations (May 6, 2010), 
http://afd-e-news.blogspot.com/2010/05/berkeley-says-no-free-speech-for.html. 
 83. Jim Tarbell, Move to Amend: The Campaign for Constitutional Change, JUSTICE 
RISING, Spring 2010, at 2; see also Manski-McCabe-Graves, “Overrule the Court” Rally in 
Madison, MOVE TO AMEND (Feb. 16, 2010), http://movetoamend.org/news/manski-mccabe-
graves-overrule-court-rally-madison (describing the participants of the rally and their goals).  
The rally was organized by the Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, the Center for Media and 
Democracy, and the Liberty Tree Foundation for the Democratic Revolution.  Id. 
 84. Manski-McCabe-Graves, supra note 83. 
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a constitutional amendment revoking the legal personhood of corporations 
and thereby strip them of all constitutional rights.  The Corporate 
Abolitionists actually see a silver lining in the Citizens United case:  it has 
become a rallying point for legal reform and a means of bringing attention 
to their cause.
85
 
Who are the Corporate Abolitionists and what is their message?  The 
following Part explores the Corporate Abolitionist movement, its 
objectives, its accomplishments, and its current attempt to change the 
meaning of the Constitution. 
III.   CORPORATE ABOLITIONISTS 
A.   Who They Are and How They Frame Their Arguments 
There are dozens of activist organizations that criticize and condemn 
what they perceive to be the dominance of corporate power in society.
86
  
These Corporate Abolitionist groups
87
 include local community 
associations and national networks, religious and secular groups, and 
organizations committed to a broad range of social justice issues.
88
  Many 
of them share similar mission statements and goals:  to “bring[] people 
together to build a progressive populist movement to end the corporate 
domination of our economy, our government, our culture, our media and 
the environment.”
89
  They seek to link with like-minded groups to form 
coalitions and networks to increase their visibility.  The internet has 
 
 85. See Doug Pibel, Real People v. Corporate “People”: The Fight Is On, 54 YES! 
MAGAZINE (May 27, 2010), http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/water-solutions/real-people-
v.-corporate-people-the-fight-is-on. 
 86. My description of these activist groups and their arguments draws upon news 
accounts, social movement scholarship, and other sources, but also relies heavily on the 
words and writings of the activists themselves.  Much of what they say about their work, 
goals, and methodology is found on their websites. 
 87. The name ‘Corporate Abolitionists’ is my term, not theirs.  I have grouped many of 
these organizations together under that label because they share a common interest in 
revoking the power and status of large corporations by abolishing corporate legal 
personhood.  However, many of these activist groups also have other objectives that are 
primary to their specific causes, e.g., promoting women’s rights, preserving the 
environment, or restoring local democratic rule. 
 88. These groups include Alliance for Democracy; Campaign to Legalize Democracy; 
Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund; Democracy Unlimited of Humboldt 
County; Liberty Tree Foundation for the Democratic Revolution; Program on Corporations, 
Law and Democracy; ReclaimDemocracy.org; Redwood Coast Alliance for Democracy; 
Ultimate Civics; and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.  This list of 
organizations is not exhaustive.  It is merely illustrative of the range of activist groups that 
are concerned about the role and power of corporations in society. 
 89. About Alliance for Democracy, THE ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, 
http://www.thealliancefordemocracy.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2011). 
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emerged as a critical mode of communication for these grassroots 
organizations, allowing them to mobilize and recruit members quickly, and 
to spread their message to a worldwide audience.
90
  Their websites are 
often quite comprehensive, linking the reader to numerous books, articles, 
and sources relating to corporate personhood and its effects on society and 
the law.
91
 
To draw attention to their cause, Corporate Abolitionists engage in a 
variety of grassroots social movement actions,
92
 including establishing 
“Abolish Corporate Personhood” affinity groups in local communities; 
writing letters to the editor and calling talk radio shows to expose the 
“illegitimacy of corporate personhood;”
93
 making presentations to civic and 
religious organizations about corporate personhood; circulating petitions to 
prevent large corporations from moving into their neighborhoods; 
organizing community-based “democracy schools” and regular “democracy 
workshops” to educate people about the perils of “corporate rule;”
94
 joining 
 
 90. Scholars who study modern social movements have noted that the internet has 
become an important and powerful tool for grassroots organizations.  See Barbara B. 
Woodhouse & Sarah R. Katz, Martyrs, The Media and the Web: Examining a Grassroots 
Children’s Rights Movement Through the Lens of Social Movement Theory, 5 WHITTIER J. 
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 121, 160 (2005).  “What the shop floor, the neighborhood, or the 
church was to prior generations of insurgents, the chat room, the email list, and the website 
may be to this generation.”  Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social 
Movements and the First Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 131 
(2001).  Cf. GARY W. SELNOW, ELECTRONIC WHISTLE-STOPS: THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET 
ON AMERICAN POLITICS 107–13 (1998) (discussing the enormous growth of political 
websites). 
 91. See, e.g., RECLAIMDEMOCRACY.ORG, http://www.reclaimdemocracy.org; PROGRAM 
ON CORPORATIONS, LAW & DEMOCRACY, http://www.poclad.org; WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL 
LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, http://www.wilpf.org; COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL 
LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.celdf.org; REDWOOD COAST ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, 
http://www.iiipublishing.com/afd/alliance.htm; CALIFORNIA DEMOCRACY.ORG, 
http://www.californiademocracy.org; BIG MEDICINE CENTRAL, http://www.nancho.net; 
DEMOCRACY UNLIMITED OF HUMBOLDT COUNTY, http://www.duhc.org; LIBERTY TREE 
FOUNDATION FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION, http://www.libertytreefoundation.org; 
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, http://www.afsc.net/ejcorpdem.html; ULTIMATE 
CIVICS, http://www.ultimatecivics.com; CENTER FOR CORPORATE POLICY,  
http://corporatepolicy.org/index.htm; CENTER FOR MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY, 
http://www.sourcewatch.org; CITIZEN WORKS, http://citizenworks.org (web sites last visited 
Sept. 28, 2011). 
 92. These actions are typical of social movement organizations that use a “repertoire of 
social movement actions” in an attempt “to shift the existing power balance, to persuade 
through force of argument, and to enhance their opportunities for civic participation.”  
Jeannie Oakes et. al., Grassroots Organizing, Social Movements, and the Right to High-
Quality Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 339, 361 (2008). 
 93. Ten Things You Can Do to Abolish Corporate Personhood, WOMEN’S INT’L 
LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.wilpf.org/docs/ccp/corp 
/ACP/Ten_Things.pdf. 
 94. The Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund hosts its “Daniel Pennock 
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public marches and rallies to promote democracy; even initiating a “walk 
across the country” to publicize their displeasure with the Citizens United 
decision.
95
  The Corporate Abolitionist movement combines traditional 
grassroots efforts to appeal to public opinion and motivate community 
involvement with a unique legal focus on constitutional reform. 
In opposing the proliferation and power of large corporations, 
Corporate Abolitionists frame their arguments in bold terms: 
Major corporations dominate our lives, our government, our 
work, our health care and our food supply.  Media conglomerates 
control the course and set the limits of public discussion, 
commercialize and debase our national consciousness, and 
manipulate mainstream public opinion.  Everywhere the natural 
world is threatened.  Yet people worldwide are exhorted to 
consume more and buy more in the name of “progress” so big 
corporations can get bigger.
96
 
A familiar theme running through the Corporate Abolitionist literature 
is that corporations have deceived citizens into believing that what is good 
for corporations is good for America and that corporations are the 
benevolent sources of jobs, prosperity, liberty, security, and progress.
97
  
Corporate Abolitionists contend that large corporations are the cause of 
devastating social, environmental, and financial harms, and that they are 
 
Democracy Schools” in states all over the country to inform citizens of the “usurpation by 
corporations of the rights of communities, people, and the earth.”  What is Democracy 
School?, COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (Oct. 10, 2011), 
http://www.celdf.org/section.php?id=149.  Democracy Unlimited of Humboldt County 
provides a “Challenging Corporate Rule, Creating Democracy Workshop” to give 
participants “skills and knowledge necessary to reclaim our democracy from corporations.”  
Introductory Workshop, DEMOCRACY UNLIMITED OF HUMBOLDT COUNTY (Oct. 10, 2011), 
http://www.duhc.org/page/introductory-workshop.  The Program on Corporations, Law & 
Democracy regularly sponsors “Rethinking the Corporation, Rethinking Democracy” 
workshops to explore “creative new campaigns to oppose corporate claims to constitutional 
authority.”  Richard L. Grossman, Wresting Governing Authority from the Corporate Class: 
Driving People into the Constitution, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 147, 159 (2002). 
 95. Steve Ranson, Lahontan Valley News: Brothers Bring Awareness to Corporate 
Personhood, MOVETOAMEND.ORG (June 3, 2010), http://movetoamend.org/news/lahontan-
valley-news-brothers-bring-awareness-corporate-personhood. 
 96. About Alliance for Democracy, supra note 89 (emphasis omitted). 
 97. See Grossman, supra note 94, at 155–56 (criticizing the perception that corporations 
are the source of jobs and progress); Scott McLarty, Fighting Corporate Power in the Wake 
of the Supreme Court’s Citizens United Ruling, MOVETOAMEND.ORG (Feb. 13, 2010), 
http://movetoamend.org/news/mclarty-fighting-corporate-power-wake-supreme-courts-
citizens-united-ruling (arguing that Americans have been “duped . . . into believing that 
what’s good for insurance companies, Wall Street firms, defense contractors, and other 
behemoths is good for America”); see also DRUTMAN & CRAY, supra note 15, at 3 (arguing 
that corporations “are not the inherently benevolent institutions that they would have us 
believe that they are” but rather are “very dangerous institutions, capable of causing great 
harm to society, particularly when left largely unregulated”). 
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really “[h]omicidal profit-seeking . . . . corporate serial killers,” rarely held 
sufficiently accountable for their wrongdoings.
98
 
Corporate Abolitionists believe that stricter regulation of corporate 
activity is not the solution.  They contend that the problem with relying on 
regulations to check corporate power is that the very nature of that power 
allows large corporations to influence the legislative and political process 
of lawmaking itself.  Corporations spend millions of dollars annually 
lobbying for political influence in government.
99
  Corporations are known 
to give substantial sums of money to both major political parties and to 
competing political candidates because, in return, corporations presumably 
gain special access to the officials who are ultimately elected, and with that 
access, “a disproportionate influence on those in power.”
100
  The obvious 
thrust of corporate political activity is to avoid or soften legal regulation of 
corporate business.  Corporations have a role in shaping laws that are 
intended to regulate their business activity.  Utilizing the input of 
corporations in particular industries, the government adopts standards that 
are worked out with the industry such that government agencies end up 
protecting the businesses they are supposed to regulate.
101
  The Corporate 
Abolitionists argue that the law looks the way it does because of the 
influence and power of corporations, reflecting the grip corporations have 
on the political machine and its law-making function.  The very law we 
trust to bind corporations and limit their potential for coercive power is 
actually formed in significant ways by corporations themselves.
102
 
It was not always this way.  The Corporate Abolitionists point out that 
during the earliest years of corporations in America, states strictly limited 
corporations from gaining the kind of power they have today.  State 
legislatures historically granted special corporate charters to businesses on 
a case-by-case basis, and these charters typically went only to corporations 
 
 98. Bruce A. Dixon, Time for a Corporate Death Penalty, BLACK AGENDA REPORT 
(June 9, 2010, 10:35), http://blackagendareport.com/print/content/time-corporate-death-
penalty. 
 99. Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence 
on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1605–07 (2006). 
 100. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 506 (2007) 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
 101. STONE, supra note 36, at 95, 107  (noting that “when an overseeing agency is in fact 
staffed with industry personnel” that “[t]he agencies almost all show evidence . . . of 
protecting the industries they are supposed to regulate, rather than the public”); see also 
DEFYING CORPORATIONS, DEFINING DEMOCRACY xiv (Dean Ritz, ed. 2001) (“Energy 
corporations determine our nation’s energy policies.  Automobile corporations determine 
our nation’s transportation policies . . . Corporate polluters and resource extraction 
corporations define our environmental policies.”). 
 102. Grossman, supra note 94, at 155; Thomas Linzey & Mari Margil, Whose Rights?, 
YES! MAGAZINE (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.yesmagazine.org/people-power/whose-rights. 
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serving a public function.
103
  Because a corporation derived its existence 
from the state, the state could restrict the powers of a corporation for the 
public interest.
104
  Laws kept corporate power in check by, for example, 
placing limits on the maximum amount of authorized capital and 
indebtedness, restricting the life span of corporations to a fixed number of 
years, and limiting corporations from holding stock in other corporations.
105
  
These constraints were imposed out of fear that corporations, if left 
unbridled, would grow so large and amass such power that they would 
become oppressive and coercive.
106
  When the Constitution was adopted, 
the Framers “took it as a given that corporations could be comprehensively 
regulated in the service of the public welfare.”
107
 
Everything changed, however, when the Supreme Court announced 
for the first time that corporations are persons for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  According to the Corporate Abolitionists, that 
was the tool corporations needed to shift themselves “from the duty side of 
the line, where they’re accountable to the people, to the rights side, where 
they get protection from government . . . .”
108
  Corporations thereafter could 
insert themselves into the text of the Fourteenth Amendment to challenge 
the validity of any laws adversely affecting their interests:  No State shall 
 
 103. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (discussing special chartering 
system); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 207 (1990) 
(explaining that historically corporations were chartered to pursue some sort of public 
function); see also Timothy L. Fort, Goldilocks and Business Ethics: A Paradigm That Fits 
“Just Right,” 23 J. CORP. L. 245, 260 (1998) (observing that “the strong sense that 
corporations ought to benefit the public” was rooted in the historical legislative practice of 
chartering corporations only if the business benefited the public). 
 104. Many legal opinions reflected this view.  See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 
(1904) (“[T]he corporation is a creature of the state.  It is presumed to be incorporated for 
the benefit of the public.”).  Chief Justice Marshall explained the granting of a charter as an 
exchange between the corporation and the state:  “The objects for which a corporation is 
created are universally such as the government wishes to promote.  They are deemed 
beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and, in most cases, 
the sole consideration of the grant [of incorporation].”  Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 637 (1819); see also A. A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the 
Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
33, 36 (1991) (noting that while the organizers of early corporations did expect profits from 
the business, “the corporations were to serve a public purpose and as such were overseen 
closely by the state which sanctioned their organization”). 
 105. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–56 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting 
in part). 
 106. Id. at 548-49.  There was “[f]ear of encroachment upon the liberties and 
opportunities of the individual.  Fear of the subjection of labor to capital.  Fear of monopoly. 
. . . There was a sense of some insidious menace inherent in large aggregations of capital, 
particularly when held by corporations.”  Id. 
 107. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 949–50 (2010) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
 108. Edwards & Morgan, supra note 20. 
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“deprive any person [corporation] of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person [corporation] within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”
109
  Corporations were instantly 
transformed into persons who could compel the state to justify its 
regulations affecting corporate business.  Stretching the meaning of the 
term ‘person’ to include corporations meant that other terms in the 
Fourteenth Amendment also required remolding:  “‘Property’—heretofore 
tangible property—had to be equated to ‘earning power’ or ‘exchange 
value’ . . . . ‘Deprived’ in turn, had to mean, not a physical taking, as 
heretofore, but rather consequential ‘diminution’ or ‘impairment’ of 
exchange value.”
110
  With this reinterpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, corporations that had been subject to strict regulation of their 
operations became the bearer of rights to oppose legislation burdening their 
interests. 
Corporate Abolitionists call this the corporate “[h]ijacking of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” and trace the consolidation of corporate power to 
this doctrine of constitutional corporate personhood.
111
  Since then, 
corporations have steadily gained almost all the inalienable rights of human 
beings guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
112
  Corporate Abolitionists warn, 
“[c]orporations are now a sort of super-being:  [t]hey can live forever, they 
cannot be jailed, they have no conscience—yet they also enjoy virtually all 
the rights that humans have.”
113
  These same basic rights, combined with 
corporations’ immense wealth and power, allow corporations to overpower 
individual citizens who consequently become second-class persons with 
little ability to oppose or resist corporate power, according to the Corporate 
Abolitionists.
114
 
 
 109. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 110. Howard J. Graham, An Innocent Abroad: The Constitutional Corporate “Person”, 
2 UCLA L. REV. 155, 164–65 (1955). 
 111. Doug Hammerstrom, The Hijacking of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
RECLAIMDEMOCRACY.ORG, 1 (2002), http://reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood/fourteenth_ 
amendment_hammerstrom.pdf.  Some scholars agree with this assessment, calling the 
extension of the Fourteenth Amendment to corporations “one of the great perverse tragedies 
in legal history.”  William Quigley, Catholic Social Thought and the Amorality of Large 
Corporations:  Time to Abolish Corporate Personhood, 5 LOY. J. PUBL. INT. L. 109, 116 
(2004). 
 112. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text; see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, 
Introduction to the Metaphors of Corporate Law, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 273, 276 (2005) 
(“Our business corporations have virtually every constitutional right against governmental 
control and regulation humans have . . . .”). 
 113. Pibel, supra note 85. 
 114. See William Meyers, The Santa Clara Blues: Corporate Personhood versus 
Democracy, 17–18 (November 13, 2000), http://reclaimdemocracy.org/pdf/primers/santa_ 
clara_blues.pdf (“Because of corporate personhood and corporate constitutional rights, the 
ordinary, natural person has become a second-class person in the eyes of the law.”).  This 
argument finds some support in corporate law scholarship.  See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 55, 
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In the last several years, Corporate Abolitionists have had some 
success in communicating their message and mobilizing grassroots efforts 
to combat corporate personhood and power.  One of their strategies has 
been to work with local governments to pass ordinances abolishing 
corporate personhood and restricting the rights of corporations in their 
communities.  Over 100 municipalities in Pennsylvania, for example, have 
passed local laws to abolish the constitutional rights of corporations.
115
  
These “anti-corporate personhood” ordinances declare that corporations do 
not have the same constitutional rights as human beings and can be 
prohibited by local government from engaging in corporate activities 
deemed harmful to the community.
116
  Towns in Virginia and Maine have 
adopted similar ordinances.
117
  In California, voters of Humboldt County a 
few years ago approved a ballot measure that labeled corporate personhood 
an “unconstitutional doctrine[]” and prohibited corporations from 
contributing money in county elections, thereby stripping corporations of 
First Amendment rights.
118
  In passing this measure, Humboldt County 
 
at 658 (arguing that “the extension of corporate constitutional rights is a zero-sum game that 
diminishes the rights and powers of real individuals”). 
 115. Channing Joseph, Conservative Pennsylvanians Pass “Radical” Laws Defying U.S. 
Constitution, THE NEW YORK SUN (July 16, 2007), http://www.nysun.com/article/58464.  
Residents of these communities have been concerned for years about environmental and 
physical harms from corporate activities in their towns, including corporate mining, the 
dumping of sewage sludge, and corporate hog farms.  Press Release, Community 
Environmental Legal Defense Fund, Packer Township, PA, Bans Corporate Sewage Sludge 
Dumping; Becomes Third Community in Nation to Ban Chemical Bodily Trespass; Strips 
Corporations of Claim to Constitutional “Rights” (June 12, 2008), 
http://www.celdf.org/article.php?id=507; Press Release, Community Environmental Legal 
Defense Fund, Pennsylvania Township is Second to Ban Corporate Mining, Concurrently 
Adopts Ordinance to Strip Corporations of “Rights” (Dec. 20, 2007), 
http://www.celdf.org/article.php?id=515; Jane Greer, Communities Fight Back, UNITARIAN 
UNIVERSALIST ASSOCIATION OF CONGREGATIONS (May 1, 2003), http://www.uuworld.org/ 
life/articles/157841.shtml (“In Pennsylvania, citizens are mobilizing on several fronts. . . . 
While some Pennsylvania counties were battling corporate farms, others were lobbying 
against corporate sewage sludge haulers.”). 
 116. Tom DiStefano, Licking Says Corporations Don’t Have “People” Rights, CLARION 
NEWS (Mar. 12, 2003), http://celdf.org/article.php?id=490; Greer, supra note 115. 
 117. Alliance for Democracy, Central Maine Town Approves Anti-Corporate 
Personhood Ordinance (June 16, 2010, 4:31 PM), http://afd-e-news.blogspot.com/2010/06/ 
central-maine-town-approves-anti.html; Press Release, Community Environmental Legal 
Defense Fund, Virginia Town First in U.S. to Ban Chemical and Radioactive Bodily 
Trespass; Also Strips Corporations of “Rights” (Feb. 7, 2008), 
http://celdf.org/article.php?id=509. 
 118. For the full text of the ordinance, see Humboldt Coalition for Community Rights, 
Humboldt County Ordinance to Protect Our Right to Fair Elections and Local Democracy, 
http://www.votelocalcontrol.org/ordinance_text.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).  The local 
Democratic and Green parties formally endorsed the measure, and it passed with 55% of the 
vote.  Kaitlin Sopoci-Belknap, Democracy Unlimited: Measure T Bans Corporate 
Campaign Financing, YES! MAGAZINE (July 29, 2007), 
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joined three other California cities—Berkeley, Arcata, and Point Arena—
that had previously passed similar resolutions abolishing corporate 
personhood.
119
  In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens 
United, the city of Berkeley recently renewed its resolution to end the 
constitutional personhood of corporations.
120
 
In fact, the Citizens United case has prompted the Corporate 
Abolitionists to continue with this strategy with even greater fervor.  They 
seek to “grow the grassroots movement to pass municipal legislation and 
resolutions that defy the Court and strip corporations of their personhood 
(human rights) status.”
121
  In doing so, they believe they can “push this 
 
http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/stand-up-to-corporate-power/democracy-unlimited. The 
law was later challenged by the Pacific Legal Foundation as unconstitutional for violating 
corporate rights and was overturned.  Organizational History, DEMOCRACY UNLIMITED OF 
HUMBOLDT COUNTY, http://www.duhc.org/page/organizational-history (last visited Sept. 27, 
2011). 
 119. The Berkeley resolution, adopted on June 15, 2004, stated “the Council of the City 
of Berkeley supports amending the United States and California Constitutions to declare that 
corporations are not granted the protections or rights of persons, and . . . to declare that the 
expenditure of corporate money is not a form of constitutionally protected speech.”  
Berkeley Becomes Latest U.S. Municipality to Oppose Corporate Constitutional “Rights”, 
RECLAIMDEMOCRACY.ORG (June 16, 2004), http://reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood/ 
berkeley_resolution.html.  The Arcata resolution was passed on May 19, 2004, stating “the 
City Council of the City of Arcata believes that no corporation should be deemed a person 
and . . . no corporation should be entitled to the same rights and protections as those 
guaranteed only to persons under the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights.”  Resolutions 
Opposing Corporate Personhood, RECLAIMDEMOCRACY.ORG (May 20, 2004), 
http://reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood/arcata_pointarena_resolutions.html.  The Point 
Arena resolution, adopted on April 25, 2000, stated “[o]nly natural persons should be able to 
participate in the democratic process. . . . Rejecting the concept of corporate personhood 
will advance meaningful campaign finance reform.”  Id.  These resolutions carry no legally 
binding effect.  Id.  Point Arena recently marked the tenth anniversary of its resolution with 
a “Democracy Day” community celebration.  Jan Edwards, “Democracy Day”: 10th 
Anniversary for Point Arena’s Anti-Corporate Personhood Resolution, THE ALLIANCE FOR 
DEMOCRACY (May 6, 2010), http://afd-e-news.blogspot.com/2010/05/democracy-day-10th-
anniversary-for.html. 
 120. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.  Corporate Abolitionists have also been 
able to incorporate their message politically through party platform planks in certain states.  
In prior years, the Democratic Party in the states of Washington, Oklahoma, New 
Hampshire and Maine adopted anti-corporate personhood planks as part of their party 
platforms.  Democrats in Washington State Officially Oppose “Money=Speech” Precedent 
and Corporate Personhood, RECLAIMDEMOCRACY.ORG (June 9, 2004), 
http://www.reclaimdemocracy.org/political_reform/democratic_party_platform_opposes_bu
ckley.html; Oklahoma Democratic Party Opposes Corporate Welfare, Personhood, 
RECLAIMDEMOCRACY.ORG (June 20, 2004), http://www.reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood/ 
oklahoma_democrats_oppose_corporate_rights.html; New Hampshire Democrats Oppose 
“Corporate Constitutional Rights”, RECLAIMDEMOCRACY.ORG (May 2004), 
http://www.reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood/new_hampshire_democratic_oppose_corpor
ate_rights.html. 
 121. Ricki Ott, A Call to Americans: Mobilize and Defy the Court, JUSTICE RISING, 
Spring 2010, at 12. 
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issue right back to the federal level and force Congress to consider 
amending the US Constitution” to abolish corporate personhood for 
good.
122
  The Corporate Abolitionists launched their Move to Amend 
campaign as another method to accomplish this task.  They hope Move to 
Amend will lead a popular uprising to demand a constitutional amendment 
that will undo 125 years of constitutional interpretation and “begin the 
world again.”
123
 
B.  “Move to Amend” Campaign in Response to Citizens United 
Corporate Abolitionists are predictably outraged by the Supreme 
Court’s extension of corporate First Amendment rights in Citizens United.  
Their condemnation of the case has been fierce:  “The court’s ruling in 
Citizens United, if left to stand, will destroy whatever hope we may ever 
have had of democracy in this country.  It will entrench corporate power as 
never before.  And the promise of America will be dashed.”
124
  While a 
blow to their cause, Citizens United has actually helped to reinvigorate the 
Corporate Abolitionists’ efforts and strengthened their resolve to lobby for 
the complete elimination of constitutional protections for corporations.  
Immediately after the decision was announced, the Move to Amend 
campaign was formed to launch a grassroots initiative to add a twenty- 
eighth amendment to the Constitution that would abolish corporate 
personhood.  Nationwide, over one hundred community-based civil rights 
and social justice organizations have joined the Move to Amend coalition.  
Many of these organizations are themselves extensive coalitions of other 
progressive groups that together create a national network of activists that 
support the campaign.
125
 
 The Move to Amend organizers have crafted the following motion 
as the centerpiece of their campaign: 
We, the People of the United States of America, reject the U.S. 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Ben Manski & Lisa Graves, Amend the Constitution to Rein in Corporations, MOVE 
TO AMEND (Feb. 12, 2010), http://movetoamend.org/news/manski-and-graves-amend-
constitution-rein-corporations. 
 124. Rothschild, supra note 11. 
 125. See Organizations, MOVE TO AMEND, http://movetoamend.org/organizations (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2011) (listing organizations that support the Move to Amend campaign 
including, among others, the National Lawyers Guild, the Alliance for Democracy, the 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, the Liberty Tree Foundation for the 
Democratic Revolution, the Green Party of the U.S., and the Independent Progressive 
Politics Network).  A separate but related campaign that was initiated in response to Citizens 
United is called FreeSpeechforPeople.org.  It also focuses on pushing for a constitutional 
amendment, but it is narrower in scope, seeking only to limit free speech rights to human 
beings, rather than tackling the broader issue of corporate personhood.  FREESPEECHFOR 
PEOPLE.ORG, http://www.freespeechforpeople.org/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2011). 
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Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United, and move to amend 
our Constitution to: 
 Firmly establish that money is not speech, and that human 
beings, not corporations, are persons entitled to 
constitutional rights. 
 Guarantee the right to vote and to participate, and to have 
our vote and participation count. . . .
126
 
Ordinary citizens are asked to sign the motion and endorse the effort 
to effect a fundamental change in the constitutional order.
127
 
The Corporate Abolitionists are well aware of what is required to 
formally amend the Constitution.  Article V of the Constitution provides 
that it may be amended in one of two ways:  (1) Congress can pass an 
amendment with a two-thirds majority in both houses, and then have three 
quarters of the states ratify it, or (2) two thirds of the states can call a 
constitutional convention, and then have three quarters of the states ratify 
the amendment.
128
  Relying more on the second route than the first, the 
Move to Amend coalition hopes to mobilize a state-led initiative to 
convene a national constitutional convention.  Many within the coalition 
fear they cannot rely on Congress to move the issue forward and believe it 
is wiser to put their energy in state initiatives that will trigger a national 
movement for a constitutional amendment.
129
  In their commitment to a 
grassroots effort, they believe “genuine change cannot be imposed from the 
top down.  It must proceed from the ground up, and the battles must be 
waged in local communities.”
130
 
The Corporate Abolitionists argue that the question whether 
corporations should have the constitutional rights of persons is a political 
question, one that should be decided by We the People, not a legal question 
that can be decided by the Supreme Court.
131
  Whether the issue is properly 
regarded as a political or legal matter is subject to debate, but legal scholars 
for many years have analyzed at least the question whether corporations 
should have First Amendment rights as a substantive legal matter.
132
  
 
 126. Motion to Amend, MOVE TO AMEND, http://movetoamend.org/motion-amend (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2011). 
 127. Id. 
 128. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 129. See Rothschild, supra note 11 (“I’m not going to rely on Congress.  For myself, the 
safest route is to put all of our energy into the state initiatives and go the constitutional 
convention route.”). 
 130. Sopoci-Belknap, supra note 118. 
 131. Challenging Corporate Personhood, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Oct./Nov. 2002, at 
30, 32. 
 132. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under 
the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981) (analyzing the relationship among the legal 
rights of stockholders, corporations’ First Amendment rights, and government delegation of 
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Support for Corporate Abolitionists’ rejection of corporate free speech 
rights can be found in the work of scholars who argue corporations should 
be distinguished from individuals under the First Amendment and that free 
speech rights should not extend equally to corporate persons and natural 
persons.
133
  They contend that corporations, with their vast economic 
resources, can speak more loudly than individuals, dominate and distort the 
debate, silence and exclude other voices, stifle conflicting ideas about 
politics and society, and ultimately destroy the integrity of the political 
process.
134
  Corporate campaign spending is simply not the same as human 
speech, which should be protected as a means of self-expression, self-
realization, and personal fulfillment.
135
  They argue, therefore, that greater 
 
power); Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected 
Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1229 
(1991) (arguing that the speech of a corporation must be distinguished from, and treated 
differently than, the speech of individuals); Kent Greenfield et al., Should Corporations 
Have First Amendment Rights?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 875 (2007) (debating the question 
whether corporations should have free speech rights); Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., The 
Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the 
Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347 (1979) (analyzing the 
complexities of applying First Amendment rights to corporations); Martin H. Redish & 
Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the 
Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (1998) (arguing for the 
constitutional protection of corporate speech); Bill Shaw et al., Corporate Political Speech 
and the First Amendment, 9 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 271 (1984) (questioning whether 
corporations should have full or limited speech rights).  
 133. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not 
Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1004 (1998) (arguing that extending free speech rights to 
corporations ultimately distorts the political process and is contrary to the goals of the First 
Amendment); Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: 
Incorporating Corporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 
WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 6–7 (2001) (asserting that large corporations are not instruments of 
individual expression and therefore corporate election-related spending does not deserve the 
same First Amendment protection enjoyed by individual political spending); William Patton 
& Randall Bartlett, Corporate “Persons” and Freedom of Speech: The Political Impact of 
Legal Mythology, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 494, 509–12 (1981) (arguing that extending First 
Amendment rights to corporate persons produces results that run counter to the values of the 
First Amendment).  Cf. Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of 
Organizational “Real Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575 (1989) (arguing that 
corporations, as collections of capital, should not have the same free speech rights as 
associations like unions, churches, and citizens’ groups that find their purpose in the 
organization of people). 
 134. J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 379, 414; Jeffrey Nesteruk, Bellotti and the Question of 
Corporate Moral Agency, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 683, 702 (“Central to the conception 
of the First Amendment is the free marketplace of ideas. . . . With unfettered corporate 
advocacy, the potential exists for this marketplace to be no longer free, but rather to become 
dominated and controlled.”). 
 135. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (noting that freedom of speech protects individual self-expression and self-
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judicial restraint in corporate challenges to campaign finance laws is not 
only appropriate but necessary to preserve democratic governance.
136
 
Some legal scholars might agree with the Corporate Abolitionists’ 
views about corporations and the First Amendment, and they may even 
share the same displeasure with the Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens 
United.  However, not all of those scholars may likewise be prepared to 
agree with the Corporate Abolitionists’ broader rejection of constitutional 
corporate personhood and their Move to Amend campaign.  One of the 
country’s leading progressive corporate law scholars, Lawrence Mitchell, 
reportedly stated, “I work with a lot of activist groups, and I sit at meetings 
banging my head on the table . . . . [because the doctrine of corporate 
personhood] is deeply embedded constitutional law that no one’s going to 
reverse.”
137
  Instead, he suggests that perhaps “activists’ energy would be 
better spent on reforming state laws to make corporations more 
accountable” rather than working on abolishing corporate personhood 
entirely.
138
 
The Corporate Abolitionists, however, say they are tired of trying to 
work within the existing legal structure and fix things with regulatory 
reform.  Their sentiment is that it is futile to spend any more “strength, 
time, and hope . . . in such dead ends”
139
 as the pursuit of “corporate 
responsibility, corporate accountability, corporate ethics, corporate codes 
of conduct, good corporate ‘citizenship,’ corporate crime, corporate reform, 
consumer protection, fixing regulatory agencies, or [promoting] 
 
realization); First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804–05, 807 (1978) (White, J., 
dissenting) (observing that corporate speech does not further the principal function of the 
First Amendment to protect self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment); THOMAS 
I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970) (discussing the values and 
functions of freedom of expression); see also Martin H. Redish, The Role of Pathology in 
First Amendment Theory: A Skeptical Examination, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 618, 627 
(1988) (noting the “role of the free speech guarantee as a catalyst in tapping and developing 
the uniquely human creative and intellectual capacities of the individual”). 
 136. See Balkin, supra note 134, at 386, 414 (arguing that greater judicial restraint in 
corporate challenges to campaign finance laws is one of the ways in which First 
Amendment jurisprudence should change).  This argument makes a connection between 
property and speech rights.  If “one of the best ways to shut someone up is to impoverish 
them,” then “that is all the more reason to regulate property used to influence the outcome 
of political campaigns.”  Id. at 413. 
 137. Barry Yeoman, When Is a Corporation Like a Freed Slave?, MOTHER JONES, Nov. 
2006, http://motherjones.com/print/15057 (quoting Lawrence Mitchell).  A federal judge 
reportedly called the anti-corporate personhood arguments of activists “tortured” and 
“illogical.”  Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Richard L. Grossman & Frank I. Adams, Taking Care of Business: Citizenship and 
the Charter of Incorporation (1993), available at  http://www.ratical.org/corporations 
/TCoB.pdf. 
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stakeholder [interests].”
140
  To the Corporate Abolitionists, these are all 
“compromises [that attempt] to make things a little less bad,” but they do 
not address the real root of the problem.
141
  It is not corporate behavior that 
must be restricted; it is corporate power.  What the Corporate Abolitionists 
seek with their Move to Amend campaign is “transformational law 
reform,” not just incremental legal change.
142
  They believe “[w]e must 
radically rethink our belief that giant corporations are legitimate parts of 
our society and return them to their rightful place as subordinate 
institutions to a sovereign, democratic people.”
143
 
In their call to action, the Corporate Abolitionists view their work as 
similar to that of the abolitionists who successfully labored to end slavery, 
the suffragists who championed women’s rights, the civil rights activists 
who opposed racial discrimination, and even the American Revolutionaries 
who resisted political oppression in the name of democratic rule.
144
  The 
Corporate Abolitionists believe that, like the abolition of slavery, the 
abolition of corporate personhood is supported by a moral imperative.  
They argue that the early abolitionists of the nineteenth century did not go 
to Congress to seek a Slavery Protection Act, or a Slavery Regulatory 
Agency, or a voluntary code of conduct for slave owners.
145
  The 
abolitionists viewed the institution of slavery as fundamentally and morally 
 
 140. Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund et al., Model Brief of Amici 
Curiae, Preface (2003), http://www.ratical.org/corporations/demoBrief.pdf.  Especially in 
the wake of Citizens United, the Corporate Abolitionists argue that regulatory reform is not 
the answer:  “Some members of our sadly dysfunctional Congress are calling for a new 
campaign finance fix.  But we’ve had a century of campaign finance fixes, and look what 
the Supreme Court has systematically done to them.”  Manski & Graves, supra note 123. 
 141. Citizen Outrage into Citizen Reform, ULTIMATE CIVICS, 
http://www.ultimatecivics.org (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
 142. Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of 
the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 87 (2001). 
 143. Molly Morgan, Women’s Int’l League for Peace and Freedom, Critique of Carly 
Fiorina, in ORGANIZING PACKET FOR THE CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH CORPORATE PERSONHOOD 
18 (Nov. 7, 2001), http://www.wilpf.org/docs/ccp/corp/ACP/acp-packet.pdf [hereinafter 
ORGANIZING PACKET]. 
 144. Sopoci-Belknap, supra note 12 (“It’s time to follow the lead of the America 
Revolutionaries, the abolitionists, the suffragists, the trade unionists, and the Civil Rights 
activists and to build a broad-based, multi-partisan democracy movement in the United 
States.”); WOMEN’S INT’L LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, supra note 22 (“[Abolishing 
corporate personhood] is as important and challenging as the efforts for Women’s Suffrage 
and the work done to end slavery.”); Yeoman, supra note 137 (“People fighting corporate 
personhood like to think of themselves as heirs to the American Revolution.”).  Social 
movements often try to link themselves to prior historical movements and draw on those 
previous movements’ compelling story to buttress the current movement’s claims.  Thus, the 
suffragists invoked abolitionist and antislavery rhetoric to give their argument extra 
persuasive force.  Balkin, supra note 49, at 50. 
 145. Morgan & Edwards, supra note 21, at 213; ULTIMATE CIVICS, supra note 141; 
Yeoman, supra note 137. 
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wrong, and therefore, “the whole thing had to go.”
146
  In the same vein, the 
Corporate Abolitionists insist constitutional corporate personhood must be 
dismantled if there is any hope of achieving democracy and equal rights.  It 
is an all or nothing proposition.  “As long as superhuman ‘corporate 
persons’ have rights under the law, the vast majority of people have little or 
no effective voice in our political arena, which is why we see abolishing 
corporate personhood as so important to ending corporate rule and building 
a more democratic society.”
147
  Through the Move to Amend campaign, the 
Corporate Abolitionists hope to “slay the dragon of corporate personhood 
once and for all.”
148
  Like other historical social movements that changed 
the culture to support a legal strategy to change the law, the Corporate 
Abolitionists stress the need for a grassroots effort to create a cultural shift 
in society favoring an amendment to the Constitution. 
The Corporate Abolitionists have no illusions about how long it will 
take to accomplish their objective.  They acknowledge it will not be easy to 
produce cultural changes in thinking, let alone obtain a constitutional 
amendment.
149
  But they encourage each other with the belief that 
grassroots anger over the Citizens United case runs high.  Drawing 
inspiration from the powerful social movements of the past that effectuated 
transformational changes in constitutional meaning, the Corporate 
Abolitionists declare, “History shows that when the public is sufficiently 
aroused, actions that once seemed impossible can, in hindsight, seem 
inevitable.”
150
 
What will happen if the Corporate Abolitionists are successful in 
abolishing corporate personhood?  They claim that once corporate 
personhood is revoked, corporations will no longer be able to assert any 
constitutional rights.  New laws and stricter regulation of corporate activity 
will be possible, and corporations will have no standing to challenge these 
laws.  For example, without First Amendment rights, corporations could be 
prohibited from engaging in campaign spending and other forms of 
political activity.  Without Fourth Amendment rights, government 
inspectors could more freely search corporate premises and seize corporate 
 
 146. Morgan & Edwards, supra note 21, at 213; see also Meyers, supra note 114, at 24 
(“The abolition of corporate personhood is part of the abolition of slavery. . . . This is not an 
optional campaign.”). 
 147. Edwards & Morgan, supra note 20. 
 148. Rothschild, supra note 11. 
 149. WOMEN’S INT’L LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, supra note 22; The POCLAD 
Story in Brief, PROGRAM ON CORPORATIONS, LAW & DEMOCRACY, 
http://www.poclad.org/?pg=By_What_Authority&show=b000101.txt (last visited Oct. 16, 
2011). 
 150. Fran Korten, 10 Ways to Stop Corporate Dominance of Politics, YES! MAGAZINE 
(Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.yesmagazine.org/people-power/10-ways-to-stop-corporate-
dominance-of-politics. 
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records to ensure compliance with labor laws, environmental laws, or 
antitrust laws.
151
  Corporate Abolitionists argue corporations could be 
prohibited from owning stock in other companies and prevented from 
becoming giant corporate conglomerates.
152
  Communities could ban 
corporations that exceed a certain size from operating in their towns and 
rely instead on local businesses and commerce.
153
  Community-controlled 
corporations and community-based trusts could deliver many essential 
goods and services.
154
  Corporations would once again be viewed as 
concessions of the government, subject to strict regulation and privileged to 
have only the limited rights the state chooses to bestow statutorily.  The 
entire structure of society would be changed if corporations no longer 
dominated the political, social, and economic landscape.  Corporate 
Abolitionists believe the consequence of abolishing corporate personhood 
is no less than the resumption of self-governance and the freedom to finally 
“define our culture as we want to see it.”
155
 
The Corporate Abolitionists’ drive for a constitutional amendment 
may sound extreme, but twenty years ago, then law professor Carl Mayer 
made the same argument in a law review article that proposed a 
constitutional amendment to declare corporations are not persons.
156
  He 
argued that, without a constitutional amendment favoring individuals over 
corporations, the Constitution would never “become the exclusive preserve 
of those whom the Framers sought to protect:  ‘real’ people.”
157
  More 
recently, other scholars have made related arguments in favor of abolishing 
corporate personhood,
158
 or at least ceasing to equate corporate 
constitutional rights with those of individuals.
159
  In the wake of the 
 
 151. Edwards & Morgan, supra note 20; Meyers, supra note 114, at 18–22. 
 152. See Women’s Int’l League for Peace and Freedom, What Could Change if 
Corporate Personhood Were Abolished?, in ORGANIZING PACKET, supra note 143, at 15 
[hereinafter What Could Change]. 
 153. Meyers, supra note 114, at 20. 
 154. Charlie Cray & Lee Drutman, Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring the 
Balance, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 305, 308 (2005). 
 155. Doug Hammerstrom, Why Bother with Corporate Personhood, CAL. CTR. FOR 
CMTY. DEMOCRACY, http://www.iiipublishing.com/afd/whybothr.htm. 
 156. Mayer, supra note 55, at 660–61. 
 157. Id. at 660. 
 158. See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 111, at 109 (arguing that “legal corporation 
personhood should be abolished” because large corporations are either amoral or immoral).  
Professor Quigley asserts that corporate regulation has failed to rein in corporations and 
make them act in ethical and socially responsible ways.  Therefore, he believes that the 
“legal fiction of corporate personhood and the constitutional rights which are given to 
corporations must cease.”  Id. at 134. 
 159. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2583 (2008) (arguing that corporations should be subjected to different 
standards than human beings when it comes to certain speech rights); Tamara R. Piety, Why 
the ACLU Was Wrong About Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 41 TULSA L. REV. 715, 725 (2006) 
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Supreme Court’s opinion in Citizens United, some legal scholars have 
expressed support for a constitutional amendment but wonder whether it 
realistically can be achieved.
160
  Rather than dismissing the views of 
corporate activists as fanatical or subversive, a few legal academics in 
recent years have promoted strategic linkages between progressive 
corporate law and progressive social movements.
161
  These linkages may 
provide broader support for the popular movement the Corporate 
Abolitionists seek to build in the aftermath of Citizens United. 
The strategy of the Corporate Abolitionists’ Move to Amend 
campaign is simple and straightforward:  put an end to the legal doctrine of 
corporate personhood.  The weakness in this approach, however, is that the 
personhood label may not be as determinative or important as the 
Corporate Abolitionists think.  As the next Part explains, with their 
steadfast focus on the personhood of corporations, Corporate Abolitionists 
arguably may be barking up the wrong tree. 
IV.   INDETERMINACY OF THE PERSONHOOD DESIGNATION (OR WHY 
PERSONHOOD DOES NOT MATTER) 
The Move to Amend campaign is supported by the belief that 
abolishing corporate constitutional personhood will diminish the legal 
power of corporations and set the stage for a dramatic transformation of 
society.  The Corporate Abolitionists argue that designating the corporation 
as a person has elevated the status of corporations and allowed them to 
claim all the same constitutional rights of natural persons.  Once you call 
the corporation a person, the corporation must be treated in a manner 
consistent with its membership in the category of persons and afforded the 
rights to which persons are due.  The underlying assumption of this 
argument is that the term “person” is a concept heavily laden with meaning 
and that labeling someone a person means certain results must follow.  
This, however, is a mistaken assumption.  Legal history shows that the 
 
(arguing that corporate persons should not be conflated with natural persons for purposes of 
constitutional rights). 
 160. Professor Zephyr Teachout reportedly stated, “I’m usually not one for constitutional 
amendments, but [the Citizens United ruling] calls for one.  Of course, if corporations can 
spend unlimited amounts opposing a constitutional amendment, any effort to enact one will 
make the 1970s campaign for an Equal Rights Amendment look like a stunning success.”  
Ted Nace, Corporations Unleashed: Landmark Supreme Court Decision to Allow Unlimited 
Spending in Federal Elections, THE INDYPENDENT (Feb. 19, 2010), 
http://www.indypendent.org/2010/02/18/corporations-unleashed. 
 161. See, e.g., Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive 
Social Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1247–51 (2002) (suggesting that supporters of 
progressive corporate law should forge alliances with other progressive social movements 
outside the law). 
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personhood designation has been inconsistently applied in constitutional 
law cases, revealing that the label itself does not dictate results.  The 
extension of constitutional rights to corporations has not been controlled by 
terminology at all, but by a rather incoherent, ad hoc approach to corporate 
rights. 
The Supreme Court has held corporations are persons for purposes of 
some constitutional protections but not for others.  For example, in 
extending Fifth Amendment double jeopardy rights to corporations, the 
Court reasoned that a corporation has the same interests a natural person 
has in avoiding “embarrassment, expense and ordeal and . . . liv[ing] in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity . . . .”
162
  Thus, corporations as 
persons are entitled to protection from further prosecution and repeated 
attempts to convict the accused.  However, the Supreme Court has declined 
to extend to corporations the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  According to the Court, “[t]he constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to 
natural individuals. . . . It is designed to prevent the use of legal process to 
force from the lips of the accused individual the evidence necessary to 
convict him . . . .”
163
  The Court has never clearly explained why a 
corporation is a person for purposes of the double jeopardy clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, but not for purposes of the self-incrimination clause of 
the same amendment.
164
  The use of the term “person” in both clauses is 
analytically indistinguishable.  The self-incrimination clause follows 
immediately after and is grammatically part of the double jeopardy clause, 
so it is difficult to understand why the self-incrimination privilege is purely 
personal while the double jeopardy protection is not.  It appears 
constitutional corporate personhood means one thing in one context and 
something else in another.
165
 
At times, the Supreme Court has unabashedly applied this selective 
approach to corporate personhood and constitutional rights even within the 
same case.  For example, in Hale v. Henkel, the Court simultaneously held 
 
 162. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977). 
 163. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944). 
 164. The Court has tried to make some cognitive peace with this inconsistency by 
asserting in conclusory terms that certain “purely personal” guarantees like the privilege 
against self-incrimination are unavailable to corporations because the “historic function” of 
the particular right has been limited to the protection of individuals.  First Nat’l Bank of 
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 165. This selective application of the personhood designation in the context of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prompted one Supreme Court Justice to remark, “It requires 
distortion to read ‘person’ as meaning one thing, then another within the same clause and 
from clause to clause.  It means, in my opinion, a substantial revision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”  Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 579 (1949) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
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corporations are persons entitled to protections from unreasonable searches 
under the Fourth Amendment, but not persons for purposes of the self-
incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.
166
  Therefore, the same case 
both supported and rejected constitutional corporate personhood at the 
same time for purposes of analyzing different rights under the Constitution. 
With respect to the First Amendment, it is clear corporations are 
persons entitled to First Amendment free speech rights.  As Citizens United 
affirmed, corporations have rights to engage in political speech, to spend 
corporate money to support or oppose political candidates, and ultimately 
to have their voice heard in the marketplace of ideas.
167
  In this regard, 
corporations may not be distinguished from individuals who have the same 
rights to express their political views and to participate fully in the electoral 
process.  However, the Supreme Court has never held that corporations are 
persons who have the right to vote, even if they can do everything an 
individual can do to influence others’ votes.  Certain rights are restricted to 
natural persons and cannot be extended to corporate persons. 
How can a corporation be a person for one constitutional right, but 
then stop being a person for another?  Once it has been granted the coveted 
status of a constitutional person, should it not then have standing to claim 
all the rights and privileges that come with that designation?  Perhaps the 
personhood label is not all it is cracked up to be.  The term does not appear 
to carry as much weight as one might expect.  Commentators have 
suggested “the Supreme Court has used only pragmatic concerns to derive 
a legal conclusion of constitutional personhood” on a case-by-case basis.
168
  
Applying corporate personhood in certain contexts and not in others is a 
matter of policy and expediency, not a matter of logic or consistent 
reasoning.  The Court extends corporations certain rights under the 
Constitution because the policy interests at stake make it wise or 
convenient to do so.  When it does not make political sense to give 
corporations certain constitutional protections, the Court limits the reach of 
corporate personhood in those areas.
169
 
The Supreme Court has never developed a unified theoretical 
justification for its conclusion that corporations are persons under the 
Constitution.  Thus, there is no coherent, consistent way of defining 
corporate constitutional rights.  The effect is a corporate personhood 
 
 166. 201 U.S. 43, 75–76 (1906), overruled in part by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of 
N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
 167. See supra Part II.C. (discussing Citizens United). 
 168. Michael D. Rivard, Toward A General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A 
Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 
1425, 1465 (1992); see also Bratton, supra note 33, at 1503 (noting the Supreme Court has 
followed a “situational practice in dealing with questions of corporate constitutional rights 
for more than a century”). 
 169. Rivard, supra note 168, at 1431. 
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jurisprudence that often seems purely result-oriented.
170
  The Court has 
utilized conflicting theories of corporate personhood to support particular 
results, rather than as guiding principles to help reach them.
171
  Corporate 
personhood is therefore a conclusion, not a question or a starting point from 
whence conclusions are derived.  If this is true, then it does not really 
matter what we call the corporation.  Instead of labeling it a person, we 
could just as easily refer to it as a “right-and-duty-bearing unit” and give it 
all the same rights and liabilities it currently carries.
172
  “[I]t becomes 
[merely] a verbal matter whether we call [corporations] all ‘persons,’ or 
whether we . . . abandon the use of the word entirely.”
173
  In other words, 
the personhood designation is not determinative and is arguably irrelevant. 
The Corporate Abolitionists attack corporate personhood so 
vehemently because they assume that as soon as you call something a 
person, you must give it the rights accorded to persons.  It turns out it is 
really the other way around.  We choose to extend corporations certain 
rights under the Constitution, whether it be First Amendment free speech 
rights or Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, and in doing so, 
we then conclude that corporations are persons under the Constitution for 
purposes of those rights.  In this sense, the term person signifies whatever 
the law makes it signify.  A person is whatever the courts say it means and 
has the rights and duties that courts decide it should have.
174
  “In this sense 
anything can be made a legal unit, and the subject of rights and duties . . . . 
[T]he law [can] accord to the last rose of summer a legal right not to be 
plucked.”
175
 
If the personhood label does not matter much and carries so little 
weight, then the Corporate Abolitionists’ call to revoke corporate 
personhood under the Constitution may be misplaced.  Due to its 
 
 170. Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a 
Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 64 (2005); Note, 
What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1754 (2001) [hereinafter What We Talk About]. 
 171. Blumberg, supra note 30, at 318. 
 172. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE 
L.J. 655, 656 (1926); see also Tara J. Radin, 700 Families to Feed: The Challenge of 
Corporate Citizenship, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 619, 651 (2003) (“Treating corporations 
as legal ‘persons’ . . . allows the legal system to enforce rights and responsibilities for the 
corporation.”). 
 173. Dewey, supra note 172, at 662. 
 174. Id. at 655–56; see also Tur, supra note 17, at 121 (arguing that “the concept of legal 
personality is wholly formal.  It is an empty slot that can be filled by anything that can have 
rights or duties”). 
 175. GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 166 (1918).  As one commentator noted about the indeterminacy of 
the personhood term, “[i]ssues do not properly turn upon a name.”  Bryant Smith, Legal 
Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283, 298 (1928). 
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indeterminacy, corporate personhood is not as powerful a doctrinal force as 
the Corporate Abolitionists seem to believe.  Therefore, abolishing the 
legal concept of corporate personhood may not effectuate the changes 
Corporate Abolitionists hope to achieve.  In focusing their efforts on 
instigating a popular movement to adopt a constitutional amendment to end 
corporate personhood, the Corporate Abolitionists have attached a level of 
meaning to the personhood designation that does not appear to be there. 
Nonetheless, the Corporate Abolitionists might respond that, even if 
corporate personhood is indeterminate and manipulable, it is still a 
powerful legal doctrine that sends the wrong message about the place 
corporations should hold in our society.  In this regard, the Corporate 
Abolitionists’ emphasis on the corporate personhood label is rooted in a 
deeper concern about the statements law makes about the intrinsic value of 
people and objects.  Although Corporate Abolitionists might not 
characterize their argument in these terms, their call to abandon the 
personhood of corporations reflects a belief in the symbolic content of the 
corporate personhood doctrine and the overall expressive function of the 
law.  The following section discusses this expressive aspect of law and 
argues that Corporate Abolitionists’ concerns about the effects of legal 
labeling may not be entirely off the mark. 
V.   EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF LAW (OR WHY PERSONHOOD DOES 
MATTER) 
Law has the capacity to do much more than control behavior through 
sanctions.  One of law’s most powerful functions is to send messages, 
make statements, and express certain beliefs and attitudes about societal 
values.
176
  Under an expressive theory of law, “law works by what it says in 
addition to what it does.”
177
  For example, sentencing laws that punish 
criminal behavior express society’s moral condemnation of certain acts, 
making a statement about the kinds of conduct the community views as 
reprehensible.
178
  Government policies that appear to endorse a particular 
 
 176. Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 40 
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2024 (1996). 
 177. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1649, 1651 (2000).  For empirical studies of the expressive function of the law, see for 
example Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal 
Compliance: The Effect of Third-Party Expression in an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game, 2 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 87, 87 (2005) (suggesting that law can lead to compliance by 
way of “facilitating coordination around a focal outcome”). 
 178. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 349, 362 (1997) (arguing that “social meaning” is central to criminal law, and the 
manner in which criminal law punishes can give one an insight into society’s moral 
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religion violate the Establishment Clause, in part because they “send[] a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community . . . .”
179
  Laws that previously legalized racial 
segregation were invalidated under the Fourteenth Amendment because, 
among other things, they communicated the harmful message that minority 
groups were inferior, disfavored members of society.
180
  Law by its nature 
has expressive elements, and we are necessarily affected by the social and 
symbolic meaning of legal doctrines and decisions.
181
 
Law makes important statements about the intrinsic and relative value 
of things.
182
  In the context of corporate personhood, for example, the law 
communicates who counts as a legal person and tells us whether 
corporations hold the same place as individuals under our legal system.  In 
upholding corporate rights under the First Amendment, the law sends the 
message that corporate speech and individual speech have the same worth 
and are deserving of the same protections.  Thus, legal doctrine signals the 
value we as a society place on people, organizations, and certain actions 
such as speech:  “When law uses the metaphor ‘person’ to define its object, 
that metaphor acts as a vehicle for expressing beliefs and values about 
persons, both legal and natural.”
183
 
Beyond merely reflecting societal views and judgments, the law 
actually helps form prevailing values and understandings.
184
  It shapes 
perceptions and affects the way people interpret the world around them.
185
  
 
compass); see also Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 
IND. L.J. 473, 498 (2006) (“The legal judgment’s purpose is, in part, to say that the 
conclusion of blameworthiness sweeps socially . . . . [B]ecause legal process . . . speaks in 
this authoritative way, its expression gets attention . . . .”); Sunstein, supra note 176, at 2023 
(“[M]any people who endorse capital punishment would not be much moved by evidence 
that capital punishment does not deter people from committing crimes.  Their primary 
concern is the symbolic or expressive content of the law, not aggregate murder rates.”). 
 179. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 180. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Elizabeth S. Anderson & 
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
1503, 1542–44 (2000) (discussing the expressive dimensions of Brown v. Bd. of Educ.). 
 181. ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 30 (1993). 
 182. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 176, at 2045–46 (noting that environmental 
emissions trading laws arguably make a statement about the value of environmental 
amenities).  Critics claim emissions trading has the damaging effect of making people see 
the environment as a commodity that can be priced, rather than something with intrinsic 
value that requires public protection.  Id.  The controversy surrounding flag burning laws 
reflects similar concerns about the statement law makes regarding the value of patriotism, 
veterans, and dissidents in our society.  Kahan, supra note 178, at 363; Sunstein, supra note 
176, at 2023. 
 183. What We Talk About, supra note 170, at 1761. 
 184. David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor after 
Kelo, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 365, 378 (2007); Joo, supra note 133, at 66. 
 185. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative 
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 
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When the law says a certain activity is proper or improper, it molds and 
changes the beliefs people hold about that activity.  Legal labels have a 
powerful effect in this regard.  For instance, racial school segregation laws 
that had the abhorrent effect of labeling black children as inferior also 
arguably shaped what those children believed about their worth.  As these 
children internalized the stigma created by discriminatory laws, they 
viewed themselves in the negative light that the law cast upon them.
186
  
Segregation inflicted serious damage to children’s self-esteem in part 
because the law unjustly stamped them with a label of inferiority, which in 
turn arguably framed their beliefs about themselves and how they related to 
the social world.
187
  The signals sent by the law influence people’s 
judgments and actions.  Legal labeling can not only create cognitive 
categories but can also “produce behavior that confirms the law’s cognitive 
categories . . . .”
188
 
In a significant sense, law is meaningful in the way that language is 
meaningful:  “How we describe something [in our choice of words] is an 
important part of how we perceive it.”
189
  Language as a system of 
discourse conditions the way people think about things.  When the law 
endorses and promotes certain theories of the corporate entity, the law 
affects our perceptions of the corporation and encourages us to view it in a 
particular light.
190
  The vocabulary the law uses to characterize corporations 
 
TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1184 (2010); Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: 
PostBehavioralist Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 621 
(2000); see also Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber 
Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 409 (2009) (demonstrating how laws have 
helped alter people’s perceptions of domestic violence from a private family matter to 
criminal conduct). 
 186. This was the point of the “doll studies” which showed that black children, given a 
choice, preferred white dolls over darker ones, arguably indicating shame over their own 
skin color.  See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 317–19 (Alfred A. Knopf 
1976). 
 187. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); KLUGER, supra note 186, at 705–
06; see also Woodhouse & Katz, supra note 90, at 126–27 (discussing the landmark nature 
of Brown v. Bd. of Educ. because the Supreme Court relied on social science evidence 
showing children’s negative psychological responses to segregation). 
 188. Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive 
Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 475, 492 (1997).  In 
fact, legal labels can “produce significant behavioral effects, evoking both internal identities 
and external expectations that channel the labeled actor into conduct that reconfirms the 
validity of the label.”  Id. at 491–92. 
 189. Ellen A. Peters, Reality and the Language of the Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1193, 1195 
(1981).  For example, “[d]epression is inherently more worrisome than sadness; due and 
deliberate speed is inherently more deliberate than due.”  Id.  Thus, language has a labeling 
function that is an integral feature of law as language.  Id. 
 190. Millon, supra note 103, at 242; Jeffrey Nesteruk, The Moral Status of the 
Corporation: Comments on an Inquiry, 2 BUS. ETHICS Q. 461, 463 (1992). 
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alters the manner in which we relate to them.  Because the “use of 
particular language has a cultural force of its own,” identifying the 
corporation as a person induces us to associate the attributes of a 
corporation with those of natural persons.
191
  Perhaps we are cognitively 
more prone to view the corporation as a person and to treat it with the same 
deference that persons are due because the law has named it as such. 
Language does more than merely describe a state of affairs.  Through 
its ability to influence thought and discussion, it helps “bring that state of 
affairs into existence.”
192
  This is because “[i]nstitutions are very much 
dependent on language:  what we cannot imagine and express in language 
has little chance of becoming a sociological reality.”
193
  This creative aspect 
of legal language is what makes it so profound.  The law not only reflects 
and incorporates pre-existing social conditions and relations.  It also has the 
capacity to establish new ones.
194
  The law tells us whether a piece of paper 
is a security, whether a person is an employee, and whether workplace 
teasing constitutes sexual harassment.  By doing so, the law transforms 
each of these items into a social and legal fact.  In this regard, the law 
creates truth, or makes things true in the eyes of the law.
195
  When the law 
creates institutions or devices like a corporation or a 401(k) plan, it brings 
into existence something that is real and true from the standpoint of the 
law.
196
  If the law says the corporation is now a person, that personhood 
becomes real and carries consequences that did not previously exist.  The 
corporation becomes a person under the law, but it is also a person as a 
sociological reality; we think and talk about the corporate person as if it 
were one of us.  When courts create a legal doctrine that says corporate 
money is speech, the expenditure of money becomes speech, and that also 
is a legal truth.
197
  It does not matter whether we initially disagree, or 
believe it is false, or think that type of speech drowns deliberative 
discussion and displaces democracy.  Over time, we are apt to see the 
world through the law’s eyes because it “tends to push [our] imaginations 
in one direction rather than in another.  It opens up some possibilities for 
thinking while foreclosing others.”
198
  In this manner, law is “constitutive” 
 
 191. Blumberg, supra note 30, at 324; see also DRUTMAN & CRAY, supra note 15, at 75; 
Mark, supra note 35, at 1478. 
 192. What We Talk About, supra note 170, at 1766. 
 193. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY 15 (1991). 
 194. Jeffrey Nesteruk, Law and the Virtues: Developing a Legal Theory for Business 
Ethics, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 361, 362 (1995). 
 195. Jack M. Balkin, The Proliferation of Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 6 
(2003). 
 196. Id. at 6–7.  When the law authorizes the creation of these items, it “is helping to 
make things in the world” that did not exist previously.  Id. at 11. 
 197. Id. at 7. 
 198. Id. at 10.  “Law has power over people’s imaginations and how they think about 
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because it forms the mental frames, categories, and schema individuals use 
to comprehend and construct the social world.
199
  The ability to shape 
people’s perceptions and understandings of the world around them “is one 
of the most important forms of power that law possesses.”
200
 
While Corporate Abolitionists may not articulate their position in 
precisely these terms, it is this expressive and constitutive power of law 
that concerns them the most.  From their perspective, the legal doctrine of 
corporate personhood sends the message that corporations count as persons 
in our society, that they possess the worth of a person under our law, and 
that they deserve the same rights and respect natural persons are accorded 
in a civilized world.  Corporate Abolitionists argue this is the wrong 
message to send.  They believe the language of corporate personhood 
reflects an inappropriate valuation of corporations vis-à-vis human beings.  
When the Supreme Court announces in cases such as Citizens United that 
corporations should not be distinguished from individuals while engaging 
in certain activities like speech, the Corporate Abolitionists contend such 
legal pronouncements disvalue human beings by improperly placing too 
much value on corporations.  After all, a corporation is a human creation, 
designed to serve the interests of its creators.  Corporate Abolitionists seek 
to end the legal personhood of corporations to stop the Supreme Court from 
continuing to send what they believe is a harmful message.
201
 
More fundamentally, because law and legal labels have the capacity to 
modify people’s perceptions and judgments, Corporate Abolitionists want 
to reconstruct the law to change the way people think about corporations.  
Labeling the corporation as a person makes it so in our minds.  Corporate 
Abolitionists fear that this legal label causes people to internalize the notion 
that corporations are persons with the same constitutional status and 
entitlements.  If we referred to corporations not as constitutional persons 
 
what is happening in the world.”  Id. at 7.  In some respects, this power over the imagination 
may arguably have certain ideological effects on individual thinking.  Id. at 10. 
 199. Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1043, 1045 n.4 (2005). 
 200. Balkin, supra note 195, at 10.  Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of 
Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 2 (1989) (noting the “pervasive and profound role law plays in shaping our society and 
our lives”). 
 201. The Corporate Abolitionists argue that the Court’s affirmation of the corporate 
personhood doctrine encourages people to forget that corporations are created by 
legislatures and have only the powers granted by the state.  Corporations 1, People 0, 
WOMEN’S INT’L LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, http://www.wilpf.org/2010CvDOp 
EdLetter (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).  For arguments that judges are expressionists, see 
Michelle Goodwin, Expressive Minimalism and Fuzzy Signals: The Judiciary and the Role 
of Law, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 19, 21 (2009); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social 
Capital and Law’s Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039, 1039–40 (1999); 
Sunstein, supra note 176, at 2028. 
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but as artificial creations, or subordinate entities, it might significantly 
transform the way corporations are understood and treated.  Thus, the 
Corporate Abolitionists’ objective to strip corporations of the personhood 
designation stems from the belief that labels are not irrelevant.  On the 
contrary, the Corporate Abolitionists assume those labels make an 
enormous difference in how we understand the world. 
The language of legal doctrine is critical because it has a cultural force 
of its own to make things true and to bring into existence things that were 
not there previously.  Although the utilization of the corporate personhood 
designation may seem indeterminate at times, it is not insignificant.
202
  Law 
does matter, and language matters too:  “Each of us is partly made by our 
language, which gives us the categories in which we perceive the world . . .  
and in remaking our language we contribute to the remaking of our 
characters and lives . . . .”
203
  The overriding goal of the Corporate 
Abolitionist movement is to remake our society and our lives by renaming 
corporations and removing them from the category of persons under the 
law.  Once corporations are no longer viewed as persons but as subordinate 
objects, the Corporate Abolitionists believe a more democratic culture can 
be cultivated.  This acknowledges that law and legal language are 
important tools for constructing cognitive frameworks and creating reality.  
The Corporate Abolitionists’ call to revoke the personhood of corporations 
is grounded in concerns about the symbolic, expressive, and constitutive 
functions of the law.  These concerns are not illegitimate, and in focusing 
so vigorously on legal labeling, the Corporate Abolitionists may be on to 
something.  They know the law sends messages; they just want the law to 
send the right ones.  We may disagree over what the right normative 
messages should be as a matter of policy and law, but in resolving that 
debate, perhaps we should pay closer attention to the signals law sends 
about social values.  If the law affects the way we perceive our world and 
ourselves, then remaking the law of corporate personhood could indeed 
have substantial and far-reaching consequences. 
The Corporate Abolitionists’ efforts to amend the Constitution may 
not end in success, but the national conversation they are hoping to start 
about the legal doctrine of corporate personhood could influence the role 
 
 202. Blumberg, supra note 30, at 324.   
[I]n the law, concepts have a life of their own because of their ability ex ante to 
influence the thinking of judges and ex post to be invoked by judges to justify 
their conclusions.  These aspects of judicial decision making have clearly been 
evident in the judicial treatment of corporate personality in the constitutional 
cases [involving corporations] . . . .   
Id. 
 203. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL 
CRITICISM 23 (1990). 
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we allow corporations to have in our politics, our culture, and our society.  
This may not be such a bad thing.  Evaluating and reevaluating the nature 
of constitutional personhood and the scope of constitutional rights is an 
important part of what makes our system of constitutional law so vibrant 
and essential.  As the final section concludes, popular movements can have 
an important part in evolving interpretations of the Constitution, and in 
some ways, our legal system needs and thrives on the public’s participation 
in the development of constitutional norms. 
 
VI.   CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United is one of the most 
controversial decisions in the history of corporate constitutional 
jurisprudence.  In striking down federal restrictions on corporate campaign 
expenditures, the Court equated the First Amendment free speech rights of 
corporations with those of human beings, provoking outrage and opposition 
from many quarters.  As a direct response to Citizens United, the Corporate 
Abolitionists’ Move to Amend campaign represents an impassioned effort 
to mobilize a mass grassroots movement to amend the Constitution to 
abolish corporate personhood.  Critics may scoff at the overly ambitious 
nature of the attempt, doubting that Corporate Abolitionists have any 
chance of attaining their objective.  After all, amending the Constitution is 
no easy task, and many social movements of the past have failed in similar 
endeavors.
204
  Yet, even if the Corporate Abolitionists are unsuccessful in 
obtaining a constitutional amendment, they may find the same success that 
other social movements have had in contesting the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution and transforming the meaning of the 
Constitution in the process. 
Take the organized women’s movement of the 1970s, for example.  
Although it failed in its effort to add the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) 
to the Constitution to prohibit sex discrimination, the law today effectively 
looks much like it would had the ERA been adopted.  For decades, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to forbid discrimination on 
the basis of gender, leading scholars to “commonly describe [the] failed 
constitutional amendment as a successful one.”
205
  Similarly, although 
 
 204. See, e.g., Paul Taylor & Philip G. Kiko, The Lost Legislative History of the Equal 
Rights Amendment: Lessons from the Unpublished 1983 Markup by the House Judiciary 
Committee, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 341, 342–43 (2007) 
(describing the failed effort of the women’s rights movement to push the Equal Rights 
Amendment through Congress). 
 205. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
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environmental activists never triumphed in securing constitutional 
protection for environmental quality, they succeeded in motivating 
widespread societal concern for environmental integrity and prompting the 
enactment of the entire environmental regulatory system in the United 
States, signifying “a transformation in American law that could be 
described as quasi-constitutional in scope.”
206
 
A social movement’s failure to amend the Constitution under Article 
V does not necessarily spell failure to change societal values and, 
ultimately, to change how the Constitution is interpreted.  The Article V 
apparatus can be used as a political forum for expressing views and making 
arguments about what the Constitution does or should mean.
207
  Debate 
over whether to amend the Constitution can create a climate for citizens to 
wrestle with important constitutional issues.  The scope and meaning of the 
Constitution is forged through disagreement and conflict over its 
interpretation, and popular movements that oppose the status quo help to 
shape the way the Constitution is applied over time.
208
  Social movements, 
such as the women’s rights movement, the environmental movement, the 
civil rights movement, or the labor movement, all have a role in 
apprehending and igniting social change.  They provide input and anger, 
opinions and outrage, and in the process of contesting established 
constitutional understandings, they have a voice in reforming the law. 
In this sense, the law needs social movements just as social 
movements need the law.
209
  From the perspective of popular 
 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1332 (2006).  
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public 
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 502 (2001) (noting that “the women’s movement . . . was able 
to do through the Equal Protection Clause virtually everything the ERA would have 
accomplished had it been ratified and added to the Constitution”); David A. Strauss, The 
Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1476–77 (2001) 
(“Today, it is difficult to identify any respect in which constitutional law is different from 
what it would have been if the ERA had been adopted.  For the last quarter-century, the 
Supreme Court has acted as if the Constitution contains a provision forbidding 
discrimination on the basis of gender.”). 
 206. Coglianese, supra note 142, at 98; see id. at 108 (noting that the environmental 
movement is considered “one of the largest, and arguably the most influential, of all the 
social movements to arise in the last century”); Oakes et al., supra note 92, at 353–58 
(noting that over the last several decades, many social movements supporting a variety of 
social causes have had a dramatic impact on altering social practices, laws, and the 
interpretation of constitutional provisions). 
 207. Siegel, supra note 205, at 1339; see also id. at 1368 n.113 (discussing the usage of 
Article V as a way of communicating with courts). 
 208. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a 
Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 303 (2001); Balkin, supra note 49, at 
28; Balkin & Siegel, supra note 27, at 928–29. 
 209. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 27, at 946; Coglianese, supra note 142, at 85; Gerald 
Torres, Social Movements and the Ethical Construction of Law, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 535, 
581–82 (2009). 
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constitutionalism, it is the people, not only the courts, that have active and 
ongoing involvement in the interpretation and enforcement of 
constitutional law.
210
  The belief that “We the People” are the authors of the 
Constitution’s text motivates social movements to challenge judicial 
pronouncements of what the Constitution means.
211
  The mobilization of 
activist groups that define themselves around questions of constitutional 
reform operates under the assumption that courts are not entitled 
exclusively to say what the law is;
212
 the Constitution as a document 
belongs to the people and no institutional authority has the right to fix the 
Constitution’s meaning.
213
 
Whether this view of constitutional interpretation is the correct one is 
subject to debate.
214
  The Corporate Abolitionists certainly subscribe to this 
 
 210. See Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959, 
959–60 (2004) (describing the system of “popular constitutionalism” as contrasted with 
“legal constitutionalism”); see also Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2598 (2003) (describing popular constitutionalism as the idea that 
“judicial review should mirror popular views about constitutional meaning”); Doni 
Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True Nature of 
Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 898–99 (2005) (describing the concept of popular 
constitutionalism).  See also Theodore Ruger, Social Movements Everywhere, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 18, 18 (2006) (describing popular constitutionalism as “probably the 
most important development in the constitutional law academy over the past decade”); id. at 
19 (noting that the analysis of social movements can be considered one subset of popular 
constitutionalism). 
 211. Siegel, supra note 205, at 1355; Siegel, supra note 208, at 298.  Ordinary citizens 
and elected officials feel authorized to talk about the meaning of the Constitution in a way 
that they do not feel authorized to speak about issues of tort or property law, for example.  
Siegel, supra note 208, at 322.  This is because they see themselves as authors and 
interpreters of the Constitution.  Id. at 345. 
 212. In this regard, social movements engage in what has been called “protestant” 
constitutional interpretation.  They do not accept the interpretations of courts as 
authoritative and final.  SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 29 (1988) (A 
“protestant” approach to the Constitution “is based on the legitimacy of individualized (or at 
least nonhierarchical communal) interpretation . . . while the catholic position is that the 
Supreme Court is the dispenser of ultimate interpretation . . . .”). 
 213. Siegel, supra note 208, at 315, 344.  See generally Torres, supra, note 209, at 536 
(suggesting that law itself “could scarcely be authoritative (or even really law) if it were not 
seen to flow from the ultimate law givers.  In a democracy, the ultimate law giver is ‘the 
people.’”) 
 214. Asserting a position of judicial supremacy, the Supreme Court predictably has 
rejected the proposition that anyone other than the Court has the power to interpret and 
enforce constitutional law.  Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) 
(asserting “that it falls to this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional 
guarantees”); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“When the Court has 
interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which 
embraces the duty to say what the law is.”).  Under this view, judicial supremacy is essential 
precisely because of its counter-majoritarian nature.  Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, 
Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 556 (1998); see also Larry Alexander 
& Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
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vision of the Constitution.  They argue that the Supreme “[C]ourt can issue 
rulings, but We the People are the rulers.”
215
  They reject the premise that 
judicial interpretations of constitutional issues are the final word:  “[J]udge-
made law is not democracy . . . . We the people have the power to change 
[it].”
216
  The Corporate Abolitionists dispute the Supreme Court’s authority 
to establish what they call the “illegitimate legal doctrine of ‘Corporate 
Personhood.’”
217
  The Move to Amend campaign resolves to remedy this 
so-called “judicial usurpation of the people’s sovereignty” by abolishing 
the constitutional standing and rights of corporations, thereby transforming 
long-standing interpretations of the Constitution.
218
  The movement’s 
organizers characterize their efforts in populist terms:  “[W]e are seizing 
the opportunity to exercise active control over our Constitution—not a 
document belonging to the Courts, nor to the Congress nor to the Chief 
Executive, but to us, the people’s Constitution.”
219
  The Corporate 
Abolitionists’ rhetoric, like that of other social movements, invokes a 
commitment to popular constitutionalism and a call to citizens to 
participate in the reconstruction of constitutional meaning. 
In this regard, is it possible that the Corporate Abolitionists’ grassroots 
movement serves a useful purpose, whether or not its claims are entirely 
plausible and irrespective of whether it succeeds in its objective to obtain a 
constitutional amendment?  By questioning and refuting the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, popular movements like that of 
 
1359, 1380 (1997).  Critics of popular constitutionalism argue as a practical matter that it is 
unclear who “the People” are and what exactly they are supposed to do to engage in 
effective constitutional interpretation.  Gewirtzman, supra note 210, at 900, 910. 
 215. Jim Hightower, Disclosing the Meekness of the ‘DISCLOSE’ Bill, ILLINOIS TIMES, 
June 3, 2010, http://www.illinoistimes.com/Springfield/print-article-7365-print.html. 
 216. What Could Change, supra note 152, at 15; see also Manski & Graves, supra note 
123 (“Beyond Congress and the Supreme Court, there is one remaining higher power, the 
power from which all authority in this country derives.  This is the power of the American 
people to amend the Constitution and alter our form of government.”); Corporate 
Personhood, RECLAIMDEMOCRACY.ORG, http://reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood/ (arguing 
that the premise of the Constitution is that “the people are the root of all power and authority 
for government”). 
 217. Sopoci-Belknap, supra note 12.  The Corporate Abolitionists contend that, with 
respect to the doctrine of corporate personhood, “[t]he Supreme Court is misguided in 
principle, and wrong on the law.”  MOVE TO AMEND, http://movetoamend.org/ (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2011). 
 218. Edwards & Morgan, supra note 20.  There is support for this type of activism in the 
body of popular constitutionalist scholarship.  See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 194 (1999) (“[T]he public generally should 
participate in shaping constitutional law more directly and . . . . reclaim [the Constitution] 
from the courts.”); Kramer, supra note 210, at 960 (presenting the “radical position” that 
“we can, literally, take the Constitution away from the courts”). 
 219. Mary Zepernick, On the History of Corporate Personhood and a Strategy for 
Overturning It, MOVE TO AMEND (Mar. 31, 2010), http://movetoamend.org/publications-
talks/zepernick-history-corporate-personhood-and-strategy-overturning-it. 
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the Corporate Abolitionists keep the public engaged in constant dialog 
about contemporary constitutional issues.  This dialogue refreshes society’s 
understanding of the Constitution and promotes citizen attachment to and 
respect for our constitutional system.
220
  Democratic collective participation 
in resolving the important legal and political dilemmas of modern life helps 
to establish a sense of community and a shared investment in chosen 
outcomes.
221
  Although the Supreme Court, through controversial decisions 
like Citizens United, plays a large role in generating and advancing debate 
over important social and political issues, popular movements that rise up 
to dispute those decisions play a significant role in doing so as well.  They 
keep the Constitution alive outside the courts,
222
 and every once in a while, 
they shape the direction of constitutional law by reorienting its meaning to 
shifting social values. 
Social movements rarely succeed in completely realizing their 
supreme goals in law.
223
  The Corporate Abolitionists face formidable 
obstacles in trying to obtain a constitutional amendment, and we can 
speculate that the likelihood of their success is small.  They press on, 
however, with the belief that even the most entrenched legal doctrines are 
not inevitable or divine.
224
  Certain social movements in history confirm 
this belief.  As the civil rights movement and the women’s rights 
movement demonstrated, “[I]n the fullness of time, utopian constitutional 
claims can ripen into constitutional orthodoxy . . . .”
225
  The law has 
changed as society has changed, and constitutional principles are ever 
evolving with the times.  Perhaps it is folly to dismiss the efforts of the 
Corporate Abolitionists prematurely, for one never knows what, if any, 
societal transformations can lie ahead. 
In the end, Corporate Abolitionists may find that achieving their 
ultimate objective to amend the Constitution is beyond their reach.  But, in 
the process of trying, they can spur a public conversation about the nature 
of corporate constitutional personhood that is relevant, even if they fail in 
 
 220. Siegel, supra note 205, at 1328–29. 
 221. Id. at 1341–43. 
 222. The literature on social movements and popular constitutionalism speaks often of 
the life of the Constitution that exists outside the courts.  See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. 
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of 
the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2022 (2003) (“[T]he Constitution 
lives a vibrant and consequential life outside the courts.”); Siegel, Text in Context, supra 
note 208, at 300–01 (noting the “rapidly growing body of constitutional theory written in 
law schools that examines the life of the Constitution outside the courts”). 
 223. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 27, at 950. 
 224. Grossman & Adams, supra note 139, at 18.  Legal scholars have made related 
arguments.  See, e.g., Millon, supra note 103, at 262 (“[H]istory should remind us that there 
is nothing inevitable about orthodoxy.  Ideas about what corporations are, and the normative 
implications that follow from those ideas, have changed radically over time.”). 
 225. Siegel, supra note 205, at 1411. 
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their endeavor to eliminate it.  Their concerns about the expressive function 
of legal statements raise significant questions about the type of world we 
want our laws to create—a world where a corporation is a person entitled to 
the same constitutional rights as individuals, or a world where corporate 
interests never trump or equal those of human beings.  Should the 
expenditure of corporate money in American politics enjoy the same First 
Amendment protection that a man possesses to speak his mind in the public 
square?  Does the doctrine of corporate personhood grant corporations too 
much power under the law?  What kind of message do we want the law to 
send about the status of corporations in our society vis-à-vis individual 
citizens?  These difficult questions are far too complex ever to be resolved 
once and for all.  From the Supreme Court’s 5–4 division in Citizens 
United, it is clear the Court itself is as divided as the rest of us on these 
controversial issues.  Rather than arresting the debate over the scope of 
corporate constitutional rights and personhood, Citizens United has 
deepened the conversation and moved the discussion forward.  The case 
may turn out to be only one skirmish in what will be a long battle over the 
meaning of the First Amendment and its relationship with corporate 
America. 
 
